Edwin L. Turnage of Harris & Graves, PA, of Greenville, for Appellant. Wesley Brian Sawyer of Murphy & Grantland, PA, of Columbia, for Respondent. Adam J. Neil, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Kristina Knight, individually and as personal representative of Daniel Knight, appeals the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Nationwide Insurance Company of America, arguing South Carolina law prohibits an insurer from excluding resident relatives from uninsured motorist and under insured motorist coverages even when the individual has been excluded from liability coverage.

William E. Applegate, IV, of Yarborough Applegate, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellants. Kathleen Chewning Barnes of Barnes Law Firm, LLC, of Hampton, for Appellants. Stephen E. Van Gaasbeck of Helotes, Texas, pro hac vice, for Appellants. Joseph Kenneth Carter, Jr. and Carmelo Barone Sammataro, both of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA, of Columbia, for Respondent. Robert L. Wise, of Richmond, Virginia, pro hac vice, for Respondent. Bettis Cantelou Rainsford, Jr. of Raymond J. Doumar, P.C., of Augusta, Georgia, for Respondent.

Steven and Claudia Newbern sued Ford Motor Company alleging strict liability and negligence arising out of an accident in which Mr. Newbern suffered injuries when the airbag in their vehicle deployed. The Newberns appeal the trial court's decision to grant Ford's motion for directed verdict. Further, the Newberns argue testimony given by a Ford employee at trial constituted a party admission, as well as, expert testimony for purposes of proving Newbern's claims.

Susan P. Ingles of S.C. Legal Services, of Greenville, for Appellant. Sharon Young Ward, of Charleston, for Appellant. Erick Matthew Barbare of The Barbare Law Firm, of Greenville, for Respondent. Craig Horger Allen of Craig H. Allen, P.A., of Greenville, for Respondent.

In this appeal from a bench trial, Wade Thompson argues the court erred in ruling in favor of NHC Healthcare/Mauldin under the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit.

William E. Applegate, IV, and David Breault Lail, both of Yarborough Applegate, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellants. Christopher James Bryant, of Charleston, for Appellants. Wesley Brian Sawyer, Rogers Edward Harrell, III, and Edward Raymond Moore, III, all of Murphy & Grantland, PA, of Columbia, for Respondent. Charles H. Williams of Williams & Williams, of Orangeburg, for Respondent.

In this civil action arising from an automobile accident, Price Oulla and Bonnie Oulla appeal the trial court's order granting Patent Seed Company's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Oullas argue the trial court erred in finding: (1) the loader of a vehicle does not owe a statutory duty under section 56 5 4100 of the South Carolina Code (2018) to ensure that the load does not escape the vehicle; and (2) the loader of a vehicle that will travel on a public highway does not owe a common law duty to third-party drivers on public highways to ensure the load does not escape the vehicle. The Oullas also appeal the trial court's order denying their motion to amend their complaint, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by finding: (1) the amendment would prejudice Patent Seed Company; and (2) the proposed amendment was futile.

Paul B. Ferrara, III, of Ferrara Law Firm, PLLC, of North Charleston, for Appellant. Brian Scott McCoy of McCoy Law Firm, LLC, of Rock Hill, for Respondents.

G. Mark Phillips and Robert William Whelan, both of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP of Charleston SC for Appellants. Kenneth Luke Connor and Christopher Caleb Connor, both of Connor & Connor LLC of Aiken, for Respondent, Laura Stewart Jordan, of Augusta, Georgia, for Respondent.

Appellants appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. They assert the trial court erred in holding neither the General Durable Power of Attorney nor the Health Care Power of Attorney provided the nursing home resident's daughter with actual or apparent authority to execute the Arbitration Agreement. They also assert the trial court erred in finding the Arbitration Agreement was unconscionable.

Gerald Akeem Gadsden appeals his Life Without Parole (LWOP) sentence and convictions for armed robbery, conspiracy, and two counts of kidnapping, arguing the trial court erred by (1) preventing him from cross-examining a State's witness concerning the witness' probation violation, and (2) denying his motion to strike the State's notice of intent to seek LWOP on the grounds of vindictive prosecution and cruel and unusual punishment.

Jon Eric Newlon of McCravy Newlon & Sturkie Law Firm, P.A., of Greenwood, for Appellant. Jeanmarie Tankersley of Clawson & Staubes, LLC, of Greenville, for Respondent.

Ginger D. Goforth of Ward Law Firm, of Spartanburg, for Appellant/Respondent. William J. Condon, Jr., Nicole Martin Wooten, and Jason Phillip Luther, all of Columbia, for Respondent/Appellant.

In this cross-appeal from the Administrative Law Court (ALC), Richard Beltram appeals the ALC's final amended order, arguing the ALC (1) erred in holding his liability for the outstanding tax liabilities of Intedge Industries (Intedge) was based on the withholding tax quarters instead of the date tax liens were filed; (2) violated his due process rights by awarding interest on the tax liens that accrued during periods of significant delay caused by the South Carolina Department of Revenue (the Department), and failing to dismiss the case despite the Department's failure to provide him timely notice of the tax liens; and (3) abused its discretion by only awarding him $675 in attorney's fees as a sanction for the Department's discovery violations. The Department also appeals the ALC's final amended order, arguing (1) this court should dismiss Beltram's appeal because he failed to comply with the requirements of section 12-60-3370 of the South Carolina Code (2014) prior to appealing; (2) the ALC erred in finding the Department is barred from collecting taxes from Beltram that were secured by tax liens against Intedge that were filed more than ten years before the Department issued its determination; and (3) the ALC abused its discretion by awarding Beltram $675 in attorney's fees as a sanction against the Department for an alleged discovery violation.

Robert Bratton Varnado of Brown & Varnado, LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellant. Alexis Wimberly McCumber of Anastopoulo Law Firm, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellant. Donald Higgins Howe of Law Offices of Donald H. Howe, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent. Michelle Jennifer Weil, of Summerville, for Respondent. Julie C. Jackson-Bailey, of Charleston, for Respondent.

In this probate dispute, Glenn Gunnells (Glenn) appeals the circuit court's order affirming a probate court's order granting Cathy G. Harkness' (Cathy) petition to set aside Helen B. Gunnells' (Testatrix) last will and testament dated July 3, 2013, (2013 Will) on the ground of undue influence. On appeal, Glenn argues the probate court made several errors that include finding the will was the product of undue influence; assigning great weight to the testimony of Testatrix's physician; admitting and giving great weight to medical records from Testatrix's pharmacies; accepting the testimony of one of Testatrix's friends; and failing to address certain errors in its order denying Glenn's motion to reconsider. Glenn asserts the circuit court??sitting as an appellate court??erred in affirming the probate court's decisions.

William M. Saltzman of Merritt, Webb, Wilson & Caruso, PLLC, of Columbia, for Appellant. Hugh L. Willcox, Jr. of Willcox Buyck & Williams, PA, of Florence, for Respondent.

Ernest Bliey appeals the circuit court's ordering denying his Rule 60(a), SCRCP, motion to correct a clerical mistake, arguing the circuit court erred in finding (1) the fact that Bliey named Herrington's, LLC as a defendant instead of Dale Herrington did not constitute a clerical error, and (2) allowing Bliey to substitute Herrington as a defendant would improperly alter the scope of the underlying judgment. Bliey also argues the circuit court erred in finding he failed to present sufficient evidence to vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP.

Karl Huggins Smith of Smith Watts & Associates, LLC, of Hartsville, for Appellant. Gregory Samuel Forman of Gregory S. Forman, PC, of Charleston, for Appellant. Kevin Mitchell Barth of Barth, Ballenger & Lewis, LLP, of Florence, for Respondent. Marian Dawn Nettles of Nettles Turbeville & Reddeck, of Lake City, for Respondent.

Alicia M. Rudick (Wife) appeals a family court order claiming the family court improperly valued several marital assets and, therefore, the equitable distribution award to Brian R. Rudick (Husband) is incorrect. In addition, Wife argues the family court erred in awarding Husband $3,000 per month in permanent periodic alimony and this court should reverse the award of attorney's fees to Husband.

James Paul Porter, of Cromer Babb Porter & Hicks, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellants. Henrietta U. Golding and James Keith Gilliam, both of Burr & Forman, LLP, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondent.

This appeal arises from a dispute over pay between Horry County (Respondent) and Wylie Neal Doyle, Timothy Lee, Anthony J. Mottola, III, and David Todd (Appellants) who are employed by Respondent as cross-trained firefighter paramedics. In 2008, Respondent approved a proficiency pay increase called Propay for firefighter paramedics. Respondent issued Statement of Wages forms to Appellants, which Appellants also signed, in April 2008. On December 11, 2014, Appellants brought the present lawsuit against Respondent, arguing Respondent violated the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10 by underpaying Appellants. Respondent asserted the defenses of the statute of limitations and full payment. At trial, Respondents moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of Appellants' case-in-chief. The trial court granted Respondent's motion for a directed verdict, finding the statute of limitations barred Appellants' claims. Appellants subsequently moved for reconsideration and a new trial, arguing the statute of limitations for their claim should be subject to the continuous accrual doctrine. Appellants also argued the doctrines of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel should apply. The trial court denied Appellants' motion for reconsideration and a new trial.