THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court 

APPEAL FROM A decision of the
SOUTH CAROLINA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION

IN RE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008 BLUFFTON TOWN COUNCIL ELECTION

Fred Hamilton, Jr., and Allyne Mitchell, Respondents,

v.

Jeff Fulgham, Normand Thomas, and the Beaufort County
Board of Elections and Voter Registration, Appellants

of whom Jeff Fulgham and Normand Thomas are

Brief of APPELLANTS

Columbia, South Carolina
February 24, 2009

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

STATUTES

OTHER AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

This matter comes to the Court through Appellants’ Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, which was granted on February 4, 2009.  The issues presented in the Petition were two-fold:

1. Whether the South Carolina State Election Commission erred when it accepted subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal from a decision of the Beaufort County Board of Elections and Voter Registration with respect to a municipal election; and

2. Whether the South Carolina State Election Commission erred when it overturned the decision of the Beaufort County Board of Elections and Voter Registration ordering a new election for two seats on the Bluffton Town Council.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a decision of the South Carolina State Election Commission on December 3, 2008, refusing to allow a new election to be held for two open seats on the Bluffton Town Council.  On November 4, 2008, an election was held for these two elective offices.  Two days later, Appellant Fulgham, a candidate for Bluffton Town Council, filed a challenge to the results of the November 4th election due to significant errors in the voter rolls regarding voters’ addresses.  The Beaufort County Board of Elections and Voter Registration (hereinafter referred to as the “Beaufort County Election Commission”) held an evidentiary hearing on Appellant Fulgham’s protest on November 7, 2008.  After taking testimony from various witnesses, including its own Executive Director, the Beaufort County Election Commission ordered a new election due to the presence of a sufficient number of voting irregularities to render the results of the race doubtful.

On November 12, 2008, Respondents filed an appeal of the Beaufort County Election Commission’s decision with the South Carolina State Election Commission and asked the State Election Commission to uphold the results of the November 4th election.  The State Election Commission held an appellate hearing on December 3, 2008, during which it voted to overturn the Beaufort County Election Commission’s decision to order a new election and sustained the results of the November 4th election.  The State Election Commission issued its written order on December 16, 2008.

On December 12, 2008, Appellants filed and served a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Court, seeking a reversal of the State Election Commission’s decision.  On February 4, 2009, the Court granted Appellants’ Petition.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case involves a dispute about the results of an election for two seats on the Bluffton Town Council, a municipal election that was held on November 4, 2008.  Four candidates ran for these seats, and the results of that election were as follows:

Results of November 4, 2008 Election for Two Seats on Bluffton Town Council

Based on these results, Respondents Hamilton and Mitchell were declared the winners of the election, the latter by a mere 26 votes over Appellant Fulgham.

Over the course of Election Day, however, it became apparent that the voter rolls provided by Beaufort County and a list of in-town addresses provided by the Town of Bluffton differed with respect to which voters actually resided within Bluffton and were therefore eligible to vote in the town council election.  Because of these discrepancies, some voters who did not live in Bluffton were miscoded in the rolls with “00,” indicating that they were eligible to vote in the town races, while some voters who lived in Bluffton were miscoded with “99,” indicating that they were ineligible to vote in the town races.  (R. pp. 8–9 (testimony of Agnes Garvin, Executive Director of the Beaufort County Election Commission).)[1]  At the hearing before the Beaufort County Election Commission, its Executive Director explained the source of the problem as follows:

[W]e received on Wednesday an accurate or what we believe[d] to be accurate street listing from the Town of Bluffton.  The street listing from the Town of Bluffton does not coincide with the street listing from our County GIS representatives and it just does not include all of the streets that the town says are in the town limits.  Conversely, our listing includes streets that the town says are not in the town.

(R. p. 8(testimony of Agnes Garvin).)[2]  This problem was identified at approximately 2:30 p.m. in the afternoon on Election Day, and the issue was apparently cured with voters who voted after that time.  (R. p. 4 (testimony of Charlie Wetmore, candidate for Town of Bluffton Mayor).)

After voting closed, the Beaufort County Election Commission’s Executive Director scrutinized the voting rolls and found the following irregularities in which voters were improperly coded with respect to the municipal races:

Breakdown of Irregularities By Precinct

(R. p. 9 (testimony of Agnes Garvin).)  Another witness testified that approximately 90 eligible Bluffton residents had been denied the opportunity to vote in the municipal races due to coding problems in the voter rolls, which was substantially more than the 26-vote difference between a winning and losing candidate in the town council race.  (R. p. 4 (testimony of Charlie Wetmore).)  Even Respondent Hamilton testified that some voters who were eligible to vote in the town council race were wrongly prohibited from doing so.  As he conceded to the Beaufort County Election Commission, he “got a number of phone calls from people who lived in the Old Town of Bluffton that said when they went vote my name was not on their ballots.”  (R. p. 16 (testimony of Respondent Fred Hamilton, Jr., candidate for Bluffton Town Council).)

After hearing this evidence, the Beaufort County Election Commission voted unanimously, with one commissioner abstaining, to hold a new election for the two seats on the Bluffton Town Council.  (R. pp. 19–20.)  The new election was scheduled to be held on November 18, 2008.  (R. p. 20.)  However, by letter dated November 12, 2008, Respondents appealed the Beaufort County Election Commission’s decision to the State Election Commission.  (R. pp. 22–23.) 

The State Election Commission held a hearing on Respondents’ appeal on December 3, 2008, during which Appellants[3] and the Beaufort County Election Commission urged the State Election Commission to reject the appeal on two grounds:  (1) the state agency did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute, and (2) the evidence presented below required the State Election Commission to uphold the local agency’s decision.  (R. pp. 26–38, 53–73.)  Despite the Beaufort County Election Commission’s determination that there was a sufficient number of balloting irregularities to render the results of the town council race doubtful, the State Election Commission voted to sustain the results of the election and to reverse the local commission’s decision to order a new election.  (R. p. 92, lines 21–22.)  The State Election Commission based the ruling on its view that the evidence considered by the Beaufort County Election Commission was “insufficient” to support a new election.  (R. p. 96.)  It made this determination despite acknowledging that it was hearing the case in its appellate capacity.  (Id.)  Appellants filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari following the State Election Commission’s decision, and the Court granted Appellants’ Petition on February 4, 2009.

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

When considering appeals related to municipal elections, this Court reviews the lower court’s decision for 1) errors of law or 2) factual determinations that are “wholly unsupported by the evidence.”  Gecy v. Bagwell, 372 S.C. 237, 241, 642 S.E.2d 569, 571 (2007).  The State Election Commission committed two crucial errors of law in this case.  First, the State Election Commission’s decision to accept subject matter jurisdiction over this case was improper, as that agency has no jurisdiction to consider matters related to municipal elections.  Second, even if jurisdiction was proper in the State Election Commission, it exceeded its authority to review the facts underlying the Beaufort County Election Commission’s decision.  As a matter of law, the State Election Commission was bound by the local agency’s factual findings, but the State Election Commission based its ruling on its own view of the facts.  Moreover, the State Election Commission’s factual ruling was squarely contrary to undisputed evidence presented to the local agency.  For these reasons, which are discussed more fully below, the State Election Commission’s decision should be reversed, and a new election should be held for two available seats on the Bluffton Town Council.

I.  THE STATE ELECTION COMMISSION DOES NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER APPEALS REGARDING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS.

A threshold question in this case is whether the State Election Commission had subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a decision of a county election commission when the county election commission adjudicated a dispute regarding a municipal election.  “‘Subject matter jurisdiction of a court depends upon the authority granted to the court by the constitution and laws of the state.’  It is axiomatic that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or conferred by consent.”  Atlanta Skin & Cancer Clinic, P.C. v. Hallmark Gen. Partners, 320 S.C. 113, 121, 463 S.E.2d 600, 605 (1995) (quoting Paschal v. Causey, 309 S.C. 206, 209, 420 S.E.2d 863, 865 (Ct. App. 1992)).  Without proper jurisdiction, the State Election Commission lacked “the power to hear and determine” this case.  Skinner v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 380 S.C. 91, 93, 668 S.E.2d 795, 796 (2008) (quoting Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314, S.C. 235, 237–38, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994)).  And as this Court frequently reminds, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including on appeal.”  Arnal v. Fraser, 371 S.C. 512, 517 n.2, 641 S.E.2d 419, 421 n.2 (2007); State v. Downs, 361 S.C. 141, 147, 604 S.E.2d 377, 380 (2004). 

As explained below, the General Assembly did not vest the State Election Commission with subject matter jurisdiction over appeals regarding municipal election protests.  The State Election Commission’s decision to reverse the ruling of the Beaufort County Election Commission in this case should be vacated as a result.

A. The South Carolina Code establishes different processes for conducting and challenging municipal elections than it does for all other elections.

The General Assembly has dedicated a chapter of the South Carolina Code to regulating elections for municipal offices.  See generally S.C. Code Ann. §§ 5-15-10 to -170.  Located in Title 5 of the South Carolina Code, these laws provide a detailed and comprehensive process for the nomination of candidates, counting ballots, establishing a municipal election commission, contesting the results of an election, and other related topics.  See, e.g., id. § 5-15-60 (providing for the nomination of candidates); id. § 5-15-120 (detailing the method for tallying the results of a municipal election); id. §§ 5-15-90 to -100 (discussing the composition and powers of a municipal election commission); id. § 5-15-130 (establishing the procedures for contesting the results of a general municipal election).

Importantly, the laws governing municipal elections are distinct from laws governing general elections for all other offices in South Carolina, which are found in Title 7 of the South Carolina Code.  While Title 5 contains provisions creating municipal election commissions for the administration of municipal elections, Title 7 creates county election commissions for purposes of canvassing the votes only for the offices of “Governor, Lieutenant Governor, state officers, circuit solicitors, members of the General Assembly, and county officers.”  Id. § 7-17-10.  This same limitation on a county election commission’s authority under Title 7 is reiterated in Section 7-17-30, which provides that “[t]he county boards shall decide all cases under protest or contest that arise in their respective counties in the case of county officers and less than county offices, except for primaries and municipal elections.”

Based on the statutes above, it is clear that the General Assembly intended to segregate municipal elections from all other state and local elections.  However, in order to relieve municipalities from having to maintain their own election commissions, South Carolina Code § 5-15-145(A) authorizes municipalities to transfer all or part of their “authority for conducting municipal elections to the county elections commission.”  Among these delegable responsibilities is the ability to resolve municipal election protests under South Carolina Code § 5-15-130.  Here, Beaufort County has accepted the responsibility of conducting municipal elections for the Town of Bluffton, including “the hearing of challenged ballots and ruling on any protests and/or complaints regarding the election or its procedures.”  See Code of Ordinances, Beaufort County § 30-3(c).  The Beaufort County Election Commission, therefore, stands in the shoes of the Town of Bluffton insofar as Bluffton’s elections are concerned.

A statutory ambiguity exists, however, with respect to where an appeal from a decision of a county election commission regarding a municipal election should be filed.  Title 5, which deals exclusively with municipal elections, routes appeals from a “decision of the municipal election commission” to the state circuit court system.  S.C. Code Ann. § 5-15-140.  Title 7, on the other hand, gives the State Election Commission subject matter jurisdiction to consider appeals of “decision[s] of the county board.”  Id. § 7-17-60.  But as discussed above, the authority of a county election commission under Title 7 expressly excludes “primaries and municipal elections.”  Id. § 7-17-30.  In short, the statutory appellate scheme has a blind spot for challenges to the results of municipal elections that are administered by a county election commission.[4]  This ambiguity should be resolved in favor of directing all appeals regarding municipal elections to local circuit courts rather than to a state agency of limited jurisdiction.

B. All appeals regarding municipal elections should be heard by circuit courts, not the State Election Commission.

It is well-settled that the Court’s primary objective in interpreting ambiguous statutes is to discern the intent of the General Assembly.  See Campbell v. Campbell, 379 S.C. 593, 599, 666 S.E.2d 908, 911 (2008) (“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.”).  In this regard, the Court will construe language used in a statute “in the light of the intended purpose of the statute.”  Broadhurst v. City of Myrtle Beach Election Comm’n, 342 S.C. 373, 380, 537 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000).  Further, “statutes are to be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which they form a part,” rather than to be read in isolation and out of context.  Roche v. Young Bros., 332 S.C. 75, 81, 504 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1998).  Even when a statutory term has a well-understood and plain meaning, the Court will reject that interpretation when to accept it “would defeat the plain legislative intent” of the statute.  Broadhurst, 342 S.C. at 380, 537 S.E.2d at 546.

Here, the General Assembly delineated guidelines for elections based on the type of elective office that was at issue, not whether the agency responsible for overseeing the election was a municipal election commission or a county election commission.[5]  For instance, it sequestered laws governing municipal elections in Title 5 of the South Carolina Code, separate and distinct from the laws governing all other elections found in Title 7.  In doing so, it expressly provided that a law specifically addressing municipal elections preempts a similar provision related to elections in general.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 5-15-10 (“Municipal primary, general and special elections shall be conducted pursuant to Title 7, mutatis mutandi, except as otherwise provided for specifically in Chapters 1 through 17.”) (emphasis added); see also George v. Mun. Election Comm’n of the City of Charleston, 335 S.C. 182, 190, 516 S.E.2d 206, 210 (1999) (“Municipal elections must be conducted pursuant to the South Carolina Election Law contained in Title 7, with any necessary changes in points of detail.”) (emphasis added).  The legislature also prescribed a specific process for challenging the results of a municipal election that is entirely different from the procedures to be followed when challenging the results of other elections.  Compare S.C. Code Ann. § 5-15-130 (requiring all municipal election protests to be filed within two days after the polls are closed and to be adjudicated within two days after the protest is filed), with id. § 7-17-30 (requiring all other election protests to be filed by noon on the Wednesday following the declaration of the results of the election, which must be made no later than noon on the Saturday following the election), and id. § 7-17-50 (requiring hearings on all non-municipal election protests to be held on the Monday following the deadline for filing protests). 

It is straightforward, therefore, that the General Assembly intended to have municipal elections resolved pursuant to the procedures outlined South Carolina Code §§ 5-15-130 and -140, which vest only South Carolina’s circuit courts with subject matter jurisdiction over appeals from challenges to the results of municipal elections.  If the legislature intended to create two different procedures for appealing the results of a municipal election based on whether a municipality delegated some of its authority to a county agency, it surely would have made this dichotomy explicit.  But the statutory provisions enabling municipalities to delegate authority for administering their elections to county election commissions did not include any language indicating that the entire statutory scheme governing municipal elections should be set aside due to a transfer of power to a county board.  Instead, the statutes were designed to have a county election commission administer a municipal election in the same manner that a municipal election commission would.[6]  This process does not include any role, appellate or otherwise, for the State Election Commission.

Because the State Election Commission was created by statute, its subject matter jurisdiction is limited only to those matters that the General Assembly allows to proceed before the agency.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 7-3-10 (creating the State Election Commission); Atlanta Skin & Cancer Clinic, 320 S.C. at 121, 463 S.E.2d at 605 (explaining that a court’s subject matter jurisdiction extends only as far as allowed by the South Carolina Constitution and statutes).  As explained above, the State Election Commission’s subject matter jurisdiction does not include appeals regarding protests over municipal elections, and it erred when it exercised jurisdiction over this case.  The Court should vacate the State Election Commission’s decision accordingly and allow a new election to be held for two seats on the Bluffton Town Council, as directed by the Beaufort County Election Commission.

II. BECAUSE THE RESULTS OF THE BLUFFTON TOWN COUNCIL RACE WERE RENDERED DOUBTFUL, THE BEAUFORT COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION RIGHTLY ORDERED A NEW ELECTION.

Even if the State Election Commission properly exercised jurisdiction over this case, its decision to prohibit a new election for seats on the Bluffton Town Council should be reversed because Appellants satisfied the requirements for voiding the election’s results.  This Court has established two prerequisites for sustaining an election protest:

1. The challenger must allege irregularities or illegalities in his notice of protest; and

2. The irregularities or illegalities must render the result of the election doubtful.

Taylor v. Town of Atl. Beach Election Comm’n, 363 S.C. 8, 16, 609 S.E.2d 500, 504 (2005) (quoting Butler v. Town of Edgefield, 328 S.C. 238, 246, 493 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1997)).  In this regard, the Court has explained that the results of an election are rendered doubtful when the number of illegal votes cast or the number of legal voters not allowed to vote exceeds the margin between the winning candidate and the losing one.  See, e.g., Armstrong v. Atl. Beach Mun. Election Comm’n, 380 S.C. 47, 48–49, 668 S.E.2d 400, 401 (2008) (requiring a new election where more voters were improperly denied the right to vote than constituted the margin between the candidates); Dukes v. Redmond, 357 S.C. 454, 458, 593 S.E.2d 606, 608 (2004) (requiring a new election where a sufficient number of people who voted in the election were not actual residents of the jurisdiction).  When the results of an election are rendered doubtful, a new election must be held.  See, e.g., Gecy, 372 S.C. at 241–43, 642 S.E.2d at 571–72 (ordering a new election due to a sufficient number of illegal votes cast).

Here, there is no legitimate dispute that Appellants satisfied the first element of the election-protest analysis.  Appellant Fulgham timely submitted a letter to the Beaufort County Election Commission stating that approximately 100 voters “were not allowed to vote” in the town council race despite living within Bluffton’s borders, including 88 voters who lived in the Bluffton 5 precinct.  (R. p. 21.)  The letter provided a “concise statement of the grounds” for this challenge, as required by South Carolina Code § 5-15-130, and sufficiently placed all parties on notice of the basis of the challenge.  See Gecy, 372 S.C. at 243, 642 S.E.2d at 572 (explaining that a notice of an election protest is sufficient if it notifies adverse parties “of the nature of the challenge” and does not contain only “general allegations of fraud”).  At no point have Respondents claimed that this letter did not place them on notice of the protest’s basis, nor did the State Election Commission take issue with the sufficiency of this letter.

In the Beaufort County Election Commission’s view, Appellants also satisfied the second element of the election-protest analysis.  But in reversing this prior ruling, the State Election Commission improperly investigated the factual basis supporting the local agency’s decision.  As a matter of law, the State Election Commission had no authority to review the facts of this case.  Further, the State Election Commission’s ultimate conclusion—that the record contained “insufficient evidence” to support the Beaufort County Election Commission’s decision—was squarely at odds with undisputed evidence indicating that a sufficient number of voting irregularities occurred to render the results of the November 4, 2008 Bluffton Town Council race doubtful.  These grounds for reversal are discussed below in turn.

A. The State Election Commission was statutorily prohibited from investigating the facts of the instant protest.

South Carolina law narrowly focuses the State Election Commission’s appellate review of a decision by a local election commission.  When sitting as an appellate body, the State Election Commission is statutorily prohibited from re-examining the facts of a case unless it is prepared to conduct a de novo hearing:

The state board is bound by the facts as determined by the county board.  However, if in the opinion of at least two members of the state board the facts should be reviewed, then a hearing de novo must be held by the state board.  In the event of a review of the facts, the state board may receive any new evidence or exhibits as it in its discretion considers necessary to determine the appeal.

S.C. Code Ann. § 7-17-70 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, even if the State Election Commission had subject matter jurisdiction here, it had no authority to investigate the facts of this case unless it opted to hold a de novo hearing, which it expressly did not do.  (See R. p. 96 (“Two members of the State Board did not call for an evidentiary hearing.  Accordingly, the State Board heard the appeal in its appellate capacity.”).)

Despite the statutory prohibition against reviewing the facts underlying the local commission’s ruling, the State Election Commission reversed the Beaufort County Election Commission’s decision to hold a new election because, in the state agency’s view, there was “insufficient evidence in the transcript” to support the prior factual determination.  (Id.)  Assessing the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the Beaufort County Election Commission, however, was beyond the State Election Commission’s appellate authority.  Instead, it was statutorily bound by the Beaufort County Election Commission’s factual determinations.  S.C. Code Ann. § 7-17-70.  The State Election Commission’s failure to defer to the local agency’s factual findings was an error of law that warrants reversal and reinstatement of the Beaufort County Election Commission’s decision to hold a new election for the available seats on the Bluffton Town Council.

B. Undisputed evidence indicated that at least 26 voters were wrongly denied the opportunity to vote in the Bluffton Town Council race.

The State Election Commission’s reversal for fact-based reasons is even more remarkable in light of the undisputed evidence in the record indicating that more than 26 in-town voters were wrongly barred from casting ballots in the Bluffton Town Council race due to errors in the voting rolls.  This Court has explained that it will uphold a decision by a local election commission unless that decision is “wholly unsupported by the evidence.”  Gecy, 372 S.C. at 241, 642 S.E.2d at 571.  The evidence presented to the local agency here more than satisfies this deferential standard. 

During the hearing before the Beaufort County Election Commission, its own Executive Director testified that she meticulously examined the voting rolls provided by her office and the rolls of in-town addresses provided by the Town of Bluffton and identified 166 voters who were wrongly barred from voting in the municipal elections or who were wrongly allowed to vote in those elections due to discrepancies between the two databases.  (R. pp. 8–9 (testimony of Agnes Garvin).)  Her inspection was so detailed that she was able to break down the number of voting irregularities by precinct.  (R. p. 9 (testimony of Agnes Garvin).)  Another witness testified that at least 90 voters were not permitted to vote in the municipal elections despite living in Bluffton as a result of the erroneous voting rolls.  (R. p. 4 (testimony of Charlie Wetmore).)  Nothing was presented to the Beaufort County Election Commission that contradicted or otherwise cast doubt on any of this evidence.  In fact, one of the Respondents even conceded to having knowledge of Bluffton residents who were improperly prohibited from voting in the municipal elections.  (R. p. 16 (testimony of Respondent Hamilton).) 

This undisputed, unchallenged evidence indicated that the combination of in-town voters who were wrongly prohibited from voting in the Bluffton Town Council race and out-of-town voters who were wrongly permitted to vote in the race far exceeded the slim 26-vote margin between the winning and losing candidates.  Under the Court’s established standards, therefore, the results of the November 4, 2008 election for Bluffton Town Council were rendered doubtful.  See, e.g., Armstrong, 380 S.C. at 48–49, 668 S.E.2d at 401 (“The record supports the finding that four voters were denied the right to vote despite the fact they met the residency requirement of S.C. Code Ann. § 7-5-120(A)(3).  Because Pierce won the election by one vote, this renders the result of the election doubtful and requires a new election.”); Gecy, 372 S.C. at 242–43, 642 S.E.2d at 571–72 (holding that a new election was required because two votes were illegally cast, which deprived the winning candidate of carrying a majority of the votes); Dukes, 357 S.C. at 458, 593 S.E.2d at 608 (“Because three votes . . . were illegally cast, and the margin of victory was only three votes, the results of this election is rendered doubtful.”).  As a result, a new election should be held for both seats, and the Court should reverse the State Election Commission’s decision upholding the results of the November 4th election accordingly.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Appellants respectfully request that the Court reverse the decision of the State Election Commission and allow a new election to be held for two seats on the Bluffton Town Council, as ordered by the Beaufort County Election Commission.

Columbia, South Carolina
February 24, 2009

[1] Appellants filed an Amended Appendix with their Reply Brief in support of their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.  Pursuant to this Court’s Order granting the Petition, Appellants are filing additional copies of the Amended Appendix contemporaneously with this brief and have Bates labeled the pages of the Amended Appendix for citation as a traditional Record on Appeal.

[2] Pursuant to South Carolina Code § 5-15-145(A), the Town of Bluffton has transferred authority to conduct its municipal elections to Beaufort County.  See Code of Ordinances, Beaufort County § 30-3.  Accordingly, the Beaufort County Election Commission was responsible for administering the election in dispute here.

[3] Because ordering a new election for all candidates is the only remedy available when challenging the results of a municipal election pursuant to South Carolina Code § 5-15-130, Appellant Thomas was added as a real party in interest during the hearing before the State Election Commission without objection.  (R. p. 48, line 8–p. 49, line 4.)

[4] Appellants have identified only one case in which an appeal regarding a municipal election that was administered by a county election commission has reached this Court.  The county election commission’s decision in that case was appealed through the State Election Commission, rather than through the circuit court system.  See Dukes v. Redmond, 357 S.C. 454, 456, 593 S.E.2d 606, 607 (2004) (noting that the Court’s consideration of the case was “on writ of certiorari to the State Election Commission”).  There, the Court reversed the State Election Commission’s decision, but it did so without any consideration of the jurisdictional question presented in this case.  See id. at 458, 593 S.E.2d at 608 (reversing the State Election Commission’s ruling for merits-based, rather than jurisdictional, reasons).

[5] The Court also characterizes election cases based on the type of election at issue, not whether the local agency charged with administering the election is a municipal or county election commission.  See, e.g., Gecy, 372 S.C. at 241, 642 S.E.2d at 571 (describing the standard of review “[i]n municipal election cases” without reference to whether the election was administered by a municipal or county election commission); Taylor v. Town of Atl. Beach Election Comm’n, 363 S.C. 8, 12, 609 S.E.2d 500, 502 (2005) (same); Broadhurst, 342 S.C. at 379, 537 S.E.2d at 545–46 (same); see also Jean Hoefer Toal et al., Appellate Practice in South Carolina 32 (2d ed. 2002) (“The procedure for contesting the results in municipal elections and appealing any determination therefrom is provided for in S.C. Code Ann. §§ 5-15-130 and 5-15-140 (1976).”).

[6] In fact, the Beaufort County Election Commission adjudicated the instant protest consistent with the expedited timeline and procedures set forth in Section 5-15-130 for challenging municipal elections, rather than the lengthier timeline set forth in Sections 7-17-30 and -50.  (See R. p. 21 (indicating that the instant protest was filed at 2:30 p.m. on November 6, 2008, within 48 hours after the polls closed, as directed by Section 5-15-130); R. p. 1 (noting that the hearing for the instant protest was held on Friday, November 7, 2008, less than two days after the protest was filed, also as directed by Section 5-15-130).)