THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State,        Respondent,

v.

Rodney Anstett,        Appellant.

Appeal From Aiken County
William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-132
Submitted January 10, 2003 � Filed February 19, 2003

AFFIRMED

Senior Assistant Appellate Defender Wanda Haile, of Columbia; for Appellant.

Deputy Director for Legal Services Teresa A. Knox, Legal Counsel Tommy Evans, Jr. and Legal Counsel J. Benjamin Aplin, all of Columbia; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Rodney Anstett appeals from an order of the trial court revoking his probation in full.� We affirm.�

FACTS

Anstett pled guilty to second degree burglary and grand larceny less than $1000.� He received a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment, suspended upon the service of five years probation, for burglary and a concurrent sentence of five years imprisonment, suspended during probation, for grand larceny.� Anstett did not appeal his convictions or sentences.

Less than three years after being released from prison, Anstett was brought before the trial judge for a probation revocation hearing.� Evidence was presented of:� at least two positive drug tests, failure to complete a public service requirement assigned by his probation officer, charge of driving under suspension, two charges of criminal domestic violence, one charge of possession of marijuana, and one charge of possession of a loaded shotgun.� The trial judge revoked Anstett�s probation in full.�

ISSUES

I. Did the trial court lack subject matter jurisdiction to accept Anstett�s plea on the offense of second degree burglary?

II. Did the trial court err in revoking Anstett�s probation?

LAW/ANALYSIS

I.��������� Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Anstett argues the trial judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea to second degree burglary.� We do not agree.

�A circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction if:� (1) there has been an indictment which sufficiently states the offense; (2) there has been a waiver of indictment; or (3) the charge is a lesser included charge of the crime charged in the indictment.�� Locke v. State, 341 S.C. 54, 56, 533 S.E.2d 324, 325 (2000).� Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time.� Carter v. State, 329 S.C. 355, 362, 495 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1998).

�A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if the person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein.�� S.C. Code Ann. � 16-11-312(A) (Supp. 2001).�

Anstett�s indictment for second degree burglary read as follows:� �[t]hat Rodney Lee Anstett did in Aiken county on or about July 21, 1994, willfully and unlawfully enter the dwelling of John Farron Duncan without consent and with the intent to commit a crime therein.�� The language of the indictment recites the required elements set forth in � 16-11-312(A).� Thus, the indictment in this case was sufficient, and Anstett was fully informed of the charge against him.� See Browning v. State, 320 S.C. 366, 368, 465 S.E.2d 358, 359 (1995) (finding the test of sufficiency of indictment is whether it contains necessary elements of offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises defendant of what he must be prepared to defend).� Accordingly, the trial judge had proper subject matter jurisdiction in this case.

II.��������� Probation Revocation

Anstett argues the trial judge erred in revoking his probation because the decision was based in part on a finding that he had violated a state law.� We do not agree.

Anstett contends the trial judge should not have considered evidence of the charges committed in violation of probation because he had not been found guilty of those offenses.� However, this argument was not made at any point during the revocation hearing.� While Anstett�s counsel stated she had �issue with a few of those� violations, this statement is insufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review.� See State v. Hamilton, 333 S.C. 642, 648, 511 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding a challenge to the validity of the probation revocation hearing must be raised to and ruled upon by the judge in order to be properly preserved).

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the original trial judge had subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case.� Further, the trial judge in the probation revocation hearing did not err in revoking Anstett�s probation.�

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and SHULER, JJ., concur.