THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Kay Cooper,        Appellant,

v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,        Respondent.

Appeal From Pickens County
Larry R. Patterson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-159
Submitted January 10, 2003 � Filed February 25, 2003�

AFFIRMED

Samuel Darryl Harms, of Greenville; for Appellant.

Laura W. H. Teer, Dana C. Mitchell, III, of Greenville; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:� The trial court directed a verdict in favor Wal-Mart in Kay Cooper�s premises liability action.� Cooper appeals arguing the trial court erred (1) in failing to find that Wal-Mart created a hazardous condition by over-stocking display shelves and (2) in failing to find that the Wal-Mart did not reasonably inspect the area for dangerous conditions.� We affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220(c) and the following authorities:� Garvin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 343 S.C. 625, 541 S.E.2d 831 (2001) (A merchant is not an insurer of the customer�s safety and owes only the duty of exercising ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition.� Absent evidence that the display was stacked in a defective manner by the merchant, or that the merchant was on notice that the display had become unsafe, there is no evidence from which a jury could find the dangerous condition was created by the merchant.) (emphasis added);� Adams v. Creel, 320 S.C. 274, 277, 465 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1995) (stating that on appeal from an order granting a directed verdict, this court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict was granted and if the evidence as a whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should have been denied); Anderson v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., 296 S.C. 204, 205, 371 S.E.2d 530, 531 (1988) (citation omitted) (�In order for a party to recover damages for injuries caused by a defective or dangerous condition on a merchant�s premises, the party must show either (1) that the injury was caused by a specific act of the merchant which created the dangerous condition, or (2) that the merchant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and failed to remedy it.�).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and SHULER, JJ., concur.��