Supreme Court Seal
Supreme Court Seal
South Carolina
Judicial Department
2003-UP-310 - Baxley v. SC Department of Corrections

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Michael C. Baxley,        Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Corrections,        Respondent.


Appeal From Richland County
L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-310
Submitted February 20, 2003 � Filed May 6, 2003


AFFIRMED


Michael C. Baxley, of Florence, for Appellant.

Lake Eric Summers, of Lexington, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:� Michael C. Baxley appeals the order of the circuit court�s grant of summary judgment in favor of the South Carolina Department of Corrections.� Baxley insists the Department is liable under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act for an assault and battery committed on him by a former guard while he was confined at the Lieber Correctional Institution.�

After a thorough review of the record and Baxley�s pro se brief, we dismiss Baxley�s appeal we affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR, and the following authorities:� Padgett v. South Carolina Insurance Reserve Fund, 340 S.C. 250, 531 S.E.2d 305, 306 (Ct. App. 2000) (Summary judgment is appropriate when it is clear there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.� In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist to preclude summary judgment, the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be reasonably drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.); S.C. Code Ann. Section 15-78-20(f) (Supp. 1976) (�The provisions of this chapter establishing limitations on and exemptions to the liability of the State, its political subdivisions, and employees, while acting within the scope of official duty, must be liberally construed in favor of limiting the liability of the State.�); Moore v. Florence Sch. Dist. No. 1, 314 S.C. 335, 444 S.E.2d 498 (1994) (Tort Claims Act does not create a new substantive cause of action against government entity); Summers v. Harrison Constr., 298 S.C. 451, 381 S.E.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1989) (Rather, it removes the common law bar of sovereign immunity in certain circumstances, but only to the extent mandated by the Act.); Moore v. Berkely County School District, 326 S.C. 584, 486 S.E.2d 9, 13 (Ct. App. 1997) S.C. Code Ann. Section 15-78-60(17) (Supp. 1976) (�The South Carolina Tort Claims Act addresses the circumstances under which a governmental entity is liable for the tortuous conduct of its employees.� However, the Act states a governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from �employee conduct outside the scope of his official duties of which constitutes actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude.��); Jones v. Winn Dixie Greenville, Inc., 318 S.C. 171, 456 S.E2d 429, 432 (Ct. App. 1995) (�[A]n assault occurs when a person has been placed in reasonable fear of bodily harm by the conduct of the defendant, and a battery is the actual infliction of any unlawful, unauthorized violence on the person of another, irrespective of its degree.�); State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Barrett, 340 S.C. 1, 530 S.E.2d 132, 137 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing USAA Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 312 S.C.536, 540, 435 S.E.2d 879, 882 (Ct. App. 1993)) (�[I]n the context of a cause of action alleging an intentional tort, which by definition cannot be committed in a negligent manner, the allegation of negligence is surplusage.�); South Carolina Med. Malpractice Liab. Ins. v. Ferry, 291 S.C. 460, 354 S.E.2d 378 (1987) (Although South Carolina allows alternative pleading, a party may not invoke coverage by couching intentional acts in negligence terms.).

AFFIRMED.�

HEARN, C.J., CURETON and GOOLSBY, JJ., concur.


[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to rule 215, SCACR.