THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee under an Agreement dated March 1, 1999 (EQCC Home Equity Loan Trust 1999-3),        Respondent,

v.

Floyd Briggs, Ezetha Green, also known as Eretha Green and as Eretha M. Green-Daniels, and Michael Daniels,        Defendants,

Of whom Ezetha Green, also known as Eretha Green and as Eretha M. Green-Daniels,        Appellants.

Appeal From Richland County
Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-661
Submitted September 17, 2003 � Filed November 17, 2003

AFFIRMED

Eretha M. Green Daniels, of Columbia, for Appellant.�

Gary Howard Johnson, II, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:� In this foreclosure action, Eretha Green appeals the grant of summary judgment on her counterclaim in favor of U.S. Bank National Association.� We affirm. [1]

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Green�s property was scheduled to be sold at a foreclosure sale when she contracted to sell it to Floyd Briggs.� The contract states the purchase price was �the amount necessary to pay the back payments on the first mortgage.� �A bolded passage of the contract explains:� �It is understood by Seller that there is to be no equity paid to Seller at closing.� Seller acknowledges that they are in foreclosure or about to be in foreclosure and Purchaser will make up the back payments on the mortgage.� �Briggs obtained an $81,000 loan from EquiCredit Corporation to purchase the property and in an affidavit claimed the conveyance was an arm�s length transaction in which he paid $79,059.50.� Although this figure matched the purchase price indicated on the deed, only $66,350 was used to pay Green�s lienholder.� It appears Green�s note to her lienholder was paid in full. �

Shortly after the closing, EquiCredit assigned its interest in Briggs� note and mortgage to U.S. Bank.� Green did not move out of the residence, and Briggs did not pay on his note.� U.S. Bank then brought suit to foreclose on the property. �In his answer, Briggs cross-claimed against Green, who was named in the foreclosure action, asserting she had �wrongfully and illegally refused to vacate the premises.� �Green did not respond timely and the case was referred to the master in equity with the consent of the parties not in default. �Green was later given leave to file an answer.� In her answer, Green counterclaimed against U.S. Bank and Briggs, asserting they had misrepresented the transaction to her and improperly arranged for her not to be paid for her property.� Green demanded a jury trial and with U.S. Bank�s consent, the master ordered Green�s claim to be placed on the jury roster.

U.S. Bank later moved for summary judgment against Green on her claim.� The court granted the motion and Green moved for reconsideration.� In a hearing on the motion for reconsideration, Green�s representative, Thurmond Guess, argued the circuit court�s decision to grant summary judgment was contrary to the master�s order which indicated the claim should be heard by a jury.� The circuit court explained the two orders were not contrary and announced a form order would be forthcoming.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Clearly, one judge cannot overrule or set aside an order of another judge of the same court.� Rule 43(l), SCRCP; Charleston County Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Father, 317 S.C. 283, 288, 454 S.E.2d 307, 310 (1995).� This longstanding rule was not violated here because the orders in question are not in conflict.� The master ordered, with the parties� consent, to have Green�s legal claim put on the jury trial roster.� See Loyola Federal Sav. Bank v. Thomasson Props., 318 S.C. 92, 93, 456 S.E.2d 423, 424 (Ct. App 1995) (noting a party who asserts a legal claim is entitled to a jury trial whereas a party who asserts an equitable claim is not entitled to a jury trial).� This ruling did not protect Green�s claim against a motion for summary judgment, however.� Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.� Rule 56(c), SCRCP.� Because Green does not challenge the propriety of the grant of summary judgment on its merits, the order on appeal is

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, STILWELL, and BEATTY, JJ., concur.