THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.� IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Jack Krauss, Appellant,
Andrew Dupre, Respondent.
Appeal From Charleston County
�John C. Few, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-090
Submitted February 2, 2009 � Filed February 20, 2009
Steven L. Smith and Zachary J. Closser, both of Charleston, for Appellant.�
Andrew Dupre, Pro Se, of Charleston, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:� In this breach of contract action, Jack Krauss argues the trial court erred granting Andrew Dupre's summary judgment motion because additional facts should have been developed.� We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Wilson v. Moseley, 327 S.C. 144, 146, 488 S.E.2d 862, 865 (1997) (stating summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v. Cox,� 301 S.C. 493, 497, 392 S.E.2d 789, 792 (1990) (holding the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial); S.C. Code Ann. �15-3-530(1) (2005) (indicating a three-year statute of limitations applies to breach of contract claims); Maher v. Tietex Corp., 331 S.C. 371, 377, 500 S.E.2d 204, 207 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Pursuant to the discovery rule, a breach of contract action accrues not on the date of the breach, but rather on the date the aggrieved party either discovered the breach, or could or should have discovered the breach through the exercise of reasonable diligence."); Rushing v. McKinney, 370 S.C. 280, 295, 633 S.E.2d 917, 925 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding Appellant was precluded from recovering on a theory of promissory estoppel where he "could not clearly articulate the terms of the alleged oral contract").� �
HEARN, C.J., PIEPER and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.