THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.� IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Ricky Lafayette Murray, Appellant,
v.
State of South Carolina a/k/a Department of Corrections, Respondents.
Appeal From Greenville County
�John C. Few, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-229
Submitted March 1, 2010 � Filed April 1,
2010���
AFFIRMED
Ricky L. Murray, pro se, of Greenville, for Appellant.
Russell� Harter, Jr., of Greenville, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM:� Ricky L. Murray filed a complaint with the circuit court against the State of South Carolina and the South Carolina Department of Corrections, alleging he was unlawfully arrested by a parole officer for a parole violation.� The circuit court granted summary judgment on behalf of the State and the Department of Corrections. �Murray appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in finding: (1) he pled guilty to possession of crack cocaine in 1994 and the arrest warrant relied on this alleged offense for probable cause; and (2) his parole arrest warrant was valid without the signature of an impartial judicial officer.� We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities.�
1. As to whether the circuit court erred in finding Murray pled guilty to possession of crack cocaine and such alleged offense supplied the arrest warrant with probable cause:� Doe v. Roe, 369 S.C. 351, 376, 631 S.E.2d 317, 330 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An issue is not preserved where the trial court does not explicitly rule on an argument and the appellant does not make a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment.").�
2. As to whether the circuit court erred in finding the parole arrest warrant valid:� S.C. Code Ann. � 24-21-680 (2007) (providing "the parole agent must issue a warrant or citation charging the violation of parole");� Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 n.3 (1973) ("Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation and parole . . . revocation of probation where sentence has been imposed previously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole.");� State v. Franks, 276 S.C. 636, 639-40, 281 S.E.2d 227, 228 (1981) (holding the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a neutral, detached magistrate issue an arrest warrant did not apply to a warrant issued by a probation officer for violations of probation conditions); State v. Hamilton, 333 S.C. 642, 647, 511 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1999) ("This court's authority to review such a decision is confined to correcting errors of law unless the lack of a legal or evidentiary basis indicates the circuit judge's decision was arbitrary and capricious.").
AFFIRMED.
SHORT, WILLIAMS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.