THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.� IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Kenneth Dippel & Kimber Fowler, Appellants,
v.
Claudus Eugene Fowler, Respondent.
Appeal From Horry County
Cynthia G. Howe, Master-in-Equity
Unpublished Opinion No.� 2011-UP-109�
Submitted March 1, 2011 � Filed March 16, 2011
AFFIRMED
Kenneth Dippel and Kimber Fowler, of Loris, pro se.
Claudus Eugene Fowler, of Loris, pro se.
PER CURIAM: Kenneth Dippel and Kimber Fowler, pro se, appeal the master-in-equity's order dismissing their actions for civil contempt and trespass against Claudus Eugene Fowler and finding Claudus has an easement by prior use.� Dippel and Kimber argue the trial court erred in (1) finding an implied easement by prior use existed, (2) dismissing Dippel's claims for lack of standing, and (3) rescinding an earlier order enjoining Claudus from travelling on Dolly Lane and subsequently dismissing Kimber's claims as moot.� We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1) and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the master erred in finding Claudus holds an implied easement by prior use: In re Estate of Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 460, 502 S.E.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding when a party receives an order that grants certain relief not previously contemplated or presented to the trial court, the aggrieved party must move, pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appeal).�
2. As to whether master erred in dismissing Dippel's trespass and contempt claims because he lacked standing: Ex parte Morris, 367 S.C. 56, 62, 624 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2006) ("[T]o have standing, a litigant must have a personal stake in the subject matter of the litigation.� One must be a real party in interest, i.e., a party who has a real, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, as opposed to one who has only a nominal or technical interest in the action.").�
3. As to whether master erred in rescinding a prior order enjoining Claudus from using Dolly Lane and subsequently dismissing Kimber's contempt and trespass claims: Timmerman, 331 S.C. at 460, 502 S.E.2d at 922 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding when a party receives an order that grants certain relief not previously contemplated or presented to the trial court, the aggrieved party must move, pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appeal).�
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., KONDUROS, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur.
[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.