THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.� IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
South Carolina Department of Social Services, Respondent,
v.
Charlese B., Travis S., Roberta S., Defendants,
Of whom,
Charlese B.,
In the interest of T.S., Minor Under the Age of 18 is, Appellant.
Appeal From Orangeburg County
Anne Gue Jones, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-262
Submitted February 8, 2011 � Filed June 7,
2011
AFFIRMED
D'Anne� Haydel, of Orangeburg, for Appellant.
Patrick L. Wright, of Orangeburg, for Respondent.
James B. Jackson, Jr, of Santee, for Guardian Ad Litem.
Roberta S., of Orangeburg, for Defendant.
PER CURIAM:� Charlese B. (Mother) appeals the family court's denial of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (the Department).[1]� Specifically, Mother argues the family court's ruling that the Department's actions in removing Child from Mother was not improperly motivated still permits the imposition of Rule 11, SCRCP, sanctions because a prior family court judge held the Department lacked probable cause to take Child into emergency protective custody. In addition, Mother also asserts the family court erred in not considering her supplemental memorandum in regard to her Rule 11, SCRCP, motion.�
In support of her argument, Mother contends the Department's basis for probable cause in removing Child was inaccurate.� The Department placed Child into emergency protective custody on the mistaken belief that Child tested positive for cocaine at her birth in November 2008.� However, the Department later determined it was actually Mother's other child, who was born ten months earlier in January 2008, who had tested positive for cocaine.� As a result, Mother argues the Department's signature on the Notice of Emergency Custody Actions violated the requirement of Rule 11 that good grounds exist to remove Child because an investigation would have revealed Child did not test positive for cocaine at birth.� See Rule 11, SCRCP ("The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it . . . .").
Mother also contends the family court erred in concluding a merits finding in favor of the Department precludes Rule 11, SCRCP sanctions under Creighton v. Coligny Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 334 S.C. 96, 512 S.E.2d 510 (Ct. App. 1998).
In deciding on Mother's Rule 11, SCRCP motion, the family court denied Mother's relief pursuant to the Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act rather than pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP.� It was incumbent upon Mother to make a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion when the family court's order was inconsistent with her requested relief for sanctions under Rule 11, SCRCP.� Therefore, we affirm the family court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authority:� Bennett v. Rector, 389 S.C. 274, 284, 697 S.E.2d 715, 720 (Ct. App. 2010) ("When a party receives an order that grants certain relief not previously contemplated or presented to the trial court, the aggrieved party must move, pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appeal.").
Because Mother's argument for Rule 11, SCRCP, sanctions is not preserved for review, we need not address the family court's denial of Mother's supplemental memorandum regarding her motion for Rule 11, SCRCP, sanctions.� See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address remaining issues when a decision on a prior issue is dispositive).
Accordingly, the family court's decision is
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.