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South Carolina
Judicial Department
2011-UP-468 - Johnson v. BMW

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.� IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals


Patricia D. Johnson, Employee, Appellant,

v.

BMW Manufacturing Corporation, LLC, Employer,

and Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest and Specialty Risk Services, Inc., Carrier, Respondents.


Appeal From the Appellate Panel
South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission


Unpublished Opinion No.� 2011-UP-468
Heard October 5, 2011 � Filed October 21, 2011�


AFFIRMED


Albert V. Smith, of Spartanburg, for Appellant.

Vernon F. Dunbar, of Greenville, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:� In this workers' compensation case, Patricia D. Johnson argues the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission) erred in finding Johnson failed to satisfy the burden of proving the occurrence of a compensable accident.� We find no error of law in the Commission's decision to deny Johnson's claim and we find the decision to be supported by substantial evidence of record; therefore, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:� S.C. Code Ann. � 1-23-380(5)(d),(e) (Supp. 2010) (providingthis court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission as to the weight of the evidence, but may reverse where the decision is affected by an error of law or clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record); Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276, 295, 599 S.E.2d 604, 614 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A determination of whether a claimant's condition was accelerated or aggravated by an accidental injury is a factual matter for the [Commission]."); id. at 289, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the administrative agency reached in order to justify its action.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, PIEPER and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.