THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State,        Respondent,

v.

Jerry M. Collins,        Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County
C. Victor Pyle, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-131
Submitted January 10, 2003 – Filed February 19, 2003

AFFIRMED

Assistant Appellate Defender Eleanor Duffy Cleary, of Columbia; for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson, Assistant Attorney General Melody J. Brown, of Columbia; Robert M. Ariail, of Greenville; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jerry M. Collins was convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.  He was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-five years imprisonment for trafficking and five years for the weapons charge.  Collins appeals his convictions and sentences.  We affirm.

FACTS

Police received an anonymous tip that Collins was at a local residence.  As there was an outstanding arrest warrant on Collins, the officers decided to effect a stop of his vehicle after he left the residence.  The officers noted that Collins was driving a car registered to Patsy Burns, who was known to be Collins’ sister.  In an attempt to stop Collins without incident, the officers set up a drivers’ license checkpoint.  However, Collins evaded the checkpoint and, after being boxed in by several police vehicles, he attempted to accelerate and push one of the vehicles out of the way.  After Collins was removed from the vehicle, officers found several items on his person including a 9 mm handgun, two small plastic bags containing white powder, some loose green plant material, and $1897 in cash.  The white powder substance field-tested positive as methamphetamine. 

The officers also recovered a .32 caliber revolver and two bank bags from the vehicle.  The first bank bag contained a set of digital scales and a total of seven small plastic bags containing a white powder.  The powder in six of these bags field-tested positive as methamphetamine.  The second bank bag contained a small plastic bag with a “green flake material” that later field-tested positive as marijuana.  There were also two pill bottles in the bag, containing a total of 36 pills that field-tested as a controlled substance.  Patsy Burns’ name was on one of the pill bottles. 

Collins’ counsel made a pre-trial motion, stating that, though he served a motion for discovery on the solicitor’s office, he had not received important documents.  Counsel stated he received the incident report before trial, but had not yet received:  a copy of the warrant, a copy of Collins’ confession, or any information about whether Patsy Burns was charged in this case.  Counsel then asked for a continuance in order to “get that discovery.”  The State countered that the only evidence not turned over to the defense were property and evidence sheets and a statement by Patsy Burns that “the car was in her name, and that the car belonged to [Collins].”  The State also clarified that, while Patsy Burns was not charged in the instant case, she was charged with the underlying conspiracy.  The trial judge denied the motion, finding the information about Patsy Burns’ involvement in a conspiracy was not exculpatory.  Collins was subsequently convicted of trafficking methamphetamine and possession of a firearm. 

LAW/ANALYSIS

Collins argues the trial judge erred in refusing to grant his discovery request.  Collins argues the State should have given him information about both his arrest warrant and Patsy Burns’ drug activities because of their exculpatory nature.  We do not agree.

Brady [1] requires the prosecution to disclose evidence in its possession which is favorable to a defendant and material to guilt or punishment.  State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 452, 503 S.E.2d 214, 219-20 (Ct. App. 1998).  Evidence is “material” under Brady only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  State v. Cain, 297 S.C. 497, 503, 377 S.E.2d 556, 559 (1988).  A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.  Id. 

While Brady mandates the State’s disclosure of exculpatory evidence, we find neither the arrest warrant nor the information about Patsy Burns was “material to guilt or punishment.”  The arrest warrant is not material under Brady because there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have changed if Collins had a copy of the arrest warrant.  Though Collins argues he would have had a better opportunity to challenge the search and seizure of the vehicle, even without an outstanding warrant, the drugs and weapons would have been discovered.  Collins evaded a license checkpoint and attempted to push a pursuing police car out of his way.  At that point, officers were justified in removing Collins from the vehicle and searching his person.  And, as Collins was sitting on the two bank bags, they would have been in plain view of the officers.  In the search that would have followed, the handguns and drugs would have been discovered.  Thus, we find there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of Collins’ case would have been different if he had received a copy of his arrest warrant.   

Likewise, information about Patsy Burns’ indictment for the underlying conspiracy does not qualify as material under a Brady analysis.  The defense was aware that Collins was driving Burns’ car and that police found a controlled substance in a bottle with Burns’ name on the label.  While the defense may not have been informed that Burns had been indicted in the underlying conspiracy, there was clearly enough evidence to put the defense on notice that Burns was involved in some kind of drug activity.  See State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. at 453, 503 S.E.2d at 220 (finding under a Brady analysis, “information is not deemed ‘material’ if the defense discovers the information in time to adequately use it at trial”).  As such, there is no reasonable probability that, had Collins been informed of Burns’ indictment, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Accordingly, we find the trial judge did not err in denying Collins’ discovery request.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Collins’ convictions and sentences are 

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and SHULER, JJ., concur.