PER CURIAM: Christian E. Maurer appeals from an order dismissing his complaint against the respondent Carol Hilliard on the ground the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her. We affirm. [1]

Maurer, a South Carolina resident, brought this action in Berkeley County against his former wife Sheila Maurer; his wife’s attorney in their divorce action, James Kahn; his own attorney in their divorce action, Vincent Stafford; and Hilliard, an attorney and the court-appointed guardian ad litem for the Maurer children. All defendants reside in Cleveland, Ohio. Maurer’s complaint alleges four causes of action against Hilliard: conspiracy, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary relationship.

Maurer’s complaint alleges, among other things: he and the defendants entered into a contract for the exercise by Maurer of his visitation rights with his children in exchange for Hilliard receiving $1,600; the parties wrote the contract “in order to grant enforcement in South Carolina of such agreement”; and the defendants breached the agreement by denying him visitation with his daughter.

Maurer contends jurisdiction exists under the South Carolina Long Arm Statute. [2] He argues it is enough to satisfy the requirements of that statute that the visitation agreement was to be partly performed in South Carolina.

For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, due process requires the existence of minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. [3] These contacts must be such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. [4] The party seeking to invoke personal jurisdiction against a nonresident by utilization of this state’s long-arm statute carries the burden of establishing jurisdiction. [5]

We agree with the trial court. Sufficient minimum contacts between Hilliard and South Carolina do not exist. For South Carolina to exercise personal jurisdiction over her would, in our minds, offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. [6]

To begin with, nothing in the complaint suggests that any act or omission committed by Hilliard (or by the other parties, for that matter) occurred in South Carolina. Hilliard, as the trial court noted, is a court-appointed guardian ad litem in a divorce proceedings conducted in Ohio. She is a resident of that state and has had no contacts at all with the State of South Carolina. Whatever her duties are as a court-appointed guardian ad litem and agent of the court, [7] they can only be exercised in the State of Ohio in the particular action in which she was appointed [8] and only during pendency of that action. [9] Moreover, to require her to travel to South Carolina to defend a suit would pose a substantial inconvenience for her. Finally, South Carolina has no interest in exercising jurisdiction, especially since the only link between Maurer and the subject matter of the action is that Maurer resides here and since the contract allegedly at issue between Maurer and Hilliard grew out of proceedings in the Ohio state court and forms part of an Ohio judgment that establishes custody and visitation rights, rights which Maurer can enforce there. [10]

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.

[2] South Carolina Code of Laws Ann. § 36-2-803 (1977).

[3] Southern Plastics Co. v. Southern Commerce Bank, 310 S.C. 256, 260, 423 S.E.2d 128, 130-31 (1992).

[5] White v. Stephens, 300 S.C. 241, 244, 247, 387 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1990).

[6] The supreme court in White v. Stephens, 300 S.C. at 247, 387 S.E.2d at 263, mentioned four factors a court may consider when determining whether minimal contacts with the forum state exists. They are: (1) the duration of the activity of the nonresident in this state; (2) the character and circumstances of the commission of the nonresident’s acts; (3) the inconvenience resulting to the parties by conferring or refusing to confer jurisdiction over the nonresident; and (4) South Carolina’s interest in exercising jurisdiction.

[7] See 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 183, at 143 (2000) (“A guardian ad litem appointed to represent an infant defendant is regarded as an officer or agent of the court, or as a fiduciary.”).

[8] Id. § 185, at 145 (“The power of a guardian ad litem is . . . ordinarily limited to matters related to the particular action in which he is appointed.”).

[9] Wilson v. Ball, 337 S.C. 493, 497 n. 8, 523 S.E.2d 804, 806 n. 8 (Ct. App. 1999).

[10] In its order, the trial court states Maurer also has an action for defamation presently pending against Hilliard in Ohio. He fails to contest this finding in his brief.