THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Kay Cooper,        Appellant,

v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,        Respondent.


Appeal From Pickens County
Larry R. Patterson, Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-159
Submitted January 10, 2003 – Filed February 25, 2003 


AFFIRMED


Samuel Darryl Harms, of Greenville; for Appellant.

Laura W. H. Teer, Dana C. Mitchell, III, of Greenville; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  The trial court directed a verdict in favor Wal-Mart in Kay Cooper’s premises liability action.  Cooper appeals arguing the trial court erred (1) in failing to find that Wal-Mart created a hazardous condition by over-stocking display shelves and (2) in failing to find that the Wal-Mart did not reasonably inspect the area for dangerous conditions.  We affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220(c) and the following authorities:  Garvin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 343 S.C. 625, 541 S.E.2d 831 (2001) (A merchant is not an insurer of the customer’s safety and owes only the duty of exercising ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition.  Absent evidence that the display was stacked in a defective manner by the merchant, or that the merchant was on notice that the display had become unsafe, there is no evidence from which a jury could find the dangerous condition was created by the merchant.) (emphasis added);  Adams v. Creel, 320 S.C. 274, 277, 465 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1995) (stating that on appeal from an order granting a directed verdict, this court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict was granted and if the evidence as a whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should have been denied); Anderson v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., 296 S.C. 204, 205, 371 S.E.2d 530, 531 (1988) (citation omitted) (“In order for a party to recover damages for injuries caused by a defective or dangerous condition on a merchant’s premises, the party must show either (1) that the injury was caused by a specific act of the merchant which created the dangerous condition, or (2) that the merchant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and failed to remedy it.”).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and SHULER, JJ., concur.  


[1] We affirm this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.