THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Thomas Arnold,        Respondent,

v.

St. John Books; David L. Crowell and Patricia Dunn-O'Connell,        Defendants,

Of Whom David L. Crowell is the        Appellant.

Appeal From Beaufort County
Thomas Kemmerlin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2003-UP-238
Submitted January 29, 2003 – Filed April 1, 2003

AFFIRMED

Terry A. Finger, of Hilton Head Island, for Appellant.

Drew A. Laughlin, of Hilton Head Island, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: A Massachusetts court entered default judgment against David Crowell on behalf of Thomas Arnold.    Arnold sought to enforce the judgment in South Carolina, where Crowell currently resides.  Crowell argued that Massachusetts lacked personal jurisdiction over him, and thus the default judgment was unenforceable.  Judge Kemmerlin enforced the judgment, and we affirm [1] pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR, and the following authorities:  Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (holding that out-of-state individuals may be subject to the personal jurisdiction of another state by purposely availing themselves of the “privilege of conduction of activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”); PYA/Monarch, Inc. v. Sowell’s Meats & Servs., Inc., 327 S.C. 469, 473, 486 S.E.2d 766, 768 (Ct. App. 1997) (requiring the court to look at the law of the state rendering the judgment to determine a judgment’s validity and effect); United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080 (1992) (stating that Massachusetts can exercise personal jurisdiction over a party to a contract if that party’s activities in the Commonwealth are instrumental in the formation of the contract); Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Hoover Treated Wood Prods., 638 N.E.2d 942 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (explaining that in order for Massachusetts to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have minimum contacts with the Commonwealth such that the assertion of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-35-940(A) (Supp. 2002) (allowing a judgment debtor to “file a motion for relief from, or notice of defense to, a foreign judgment on the grounds that the foreign judgment has been appealed from, that enforcement has been stayed by the court which rendered it, or on any other ground for which relief from a judgment of this State is allowed”) ; S.C. Code Ann. §  15-35-940(B) (“[T]he judgment creditor has the burden of proving that the foreign judgment is entitled to full faith and credit.”); Mass. Gen. Law 223A § 3 et seq. (defining the long-arm statute of Massachusetts).

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., GOOLSBY and SHULER, JJ., concur.