THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Victor Harvey Anderson, Appellant.

Appeal From Charleston County
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-015
Submitted November 1, 2010 – Filed January 25, 2011   

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of Columbia; Solicitor Scarlett Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Victor Harvey Anderson appeals his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, arguing the trial court erred in (1) declining to find the Sex Offender Registry Law unconstitutional and in violation of the Due Process Clause; (2) denying his motion for directed verdict; (3) admitting testimony regarding a prior bad act; and (4) admitting testimony regarding a form signed by Anderson.  We affirm.[1] 

1. As to whether the trial court erred in declining to find the Sex Offender Registry Law unconstitutional, this issue is not preserved for our review because Anderson did not raise this issue to the trial court.  See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge."). 

2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Anderson's motion for directed verdict because the State did not provide evidence of notice, a review of the statutory language in section 23-3-460 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2009) indicates the South Carolina Legislature did not include language requiring the State to notify sex offenders regarding the change in registration requirements when it amended the statute in 2006 to require registration on a biannual basis.  Any attempt to insert a notification requirement into section 23-3-460 would run contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute.  See State v. Brannon, 379 S.C. 487, 496, 666 S.E.2d 272, 276 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction.").  Thus, the State provided substantial direct evidence proving Anderson was guilty of failing to register as a sex offender because Detective Catlett testified Anderson did not register on May 5, 2007, as required by statute.  See State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292-93, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the [appellate court] must find the case was properly submitted to the jury.").  Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied Anderson's motion for directed verdict.          

3. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding Anderson's failure to provide an updated address as required by statute, Anderson's challenge to Catlett's statement on the basis of a prior bad act is not preserved for our review because Anderson did not object to the statement on this basis before the trial court.  See Dunbar, 356 S.C. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 693 ("In order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge.").  Regarding the inadmissibility of the statement on the basis of hearsay, we hold the trial court correctly admitted Catlett's testimony.  The statement did not qualify as hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted – whether Anderson failed to register in the past.    Instead, the statement was offered to explain how Catlett conducted her investigation.  See Rule 801(c), SCRE (stating hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted).   

4. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting Catlett's testimony regarding a form signed by Anderson, we find this issue is abandoned.  See Rule 208(b)(1)(D), SCACR ("[T]he particular issue to be addressed shall be set forth in distinctive type, followed by discussion and citations of authority."); Hunt v. Forestry Comm'n, 358 S.C. 564, 573, 595 S.E.2d 846, 851 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Issues raised in a brief but not supported by authority are deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal.").  Additionally, the admission of Catlett's statement was harmless and did not prejudice Anderson because it was cumulative to other testimony offered by Catlett.  Catlett testified without objection that Anderson was notified three times about the change in the registration requirements.  See State v. Good, 308 S.C. 308, 311, 417 S.E.2d 640, 642 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding the admission of improper hearsay evidence is harmless when it is merely cumulative to other evidence admitted without objection). 

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, PIEPER, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.