THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Nikol Maman, Individually and as Natural Guardian for Lorelle M., a Minor, Appellant,

v.

Horry County School District, Respondent.

Appeal From Horry County
 Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-591
Heard November 1, 2011 – Filed December 21, 2011   

AFFIRMED

Daniel A. Hunnicut, of Conway, for Appellant.

Allen D. Smith and Jasmine R. Drain, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this personal injury case resulting from a student, Lorelle M., being injured during a school physical education class, her mother, Nikol Maman, individually and as guardian, appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Horry County School District (the District).  Maman contends the trial court erred in finding the evidence only supported the inference the District exercised at least slight care.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002) (providing that when reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP; summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); Sauner v. Pub. Serv. Auth. of S.C., 354 S.C. 397, 404, 581 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2003) (noting that in determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party); Flateau v. Harrelson, 355 S.C. 197, 203, 584 S.E.2d 413, 416 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The Tort Claims Act [(the Act)] governs all tort claims against governmental entities and is the exclusive civil remedy available in an action against a governmental entity . . . ."); Sabb v. S.C. State Univ., 350 S.C. 416, 428, 567 S.E.2d 231, 237 (2002) (stating the Act waives immunity for torts committed by the State, its political subdivisions, and governmental employees acting within the scope of their official duties with some exceptions); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(25) (2005) (providing an exception to the waiver of immunity for a loss resulting from responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any student of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner); Etheredge v. Richland Sch. Dist. One, 341 S.C. 307, 310, 534 S.E.2d 275, 277 (2000) ("[W]hile gross negligence ordinarily is a mixed question of law and fact, when the evidence supports but one reasonable inference, the question becomes a matter of law for the court."); Grooms v. Marlboro Cnty. Sch. Dist., 307 S.C. 310, 313, 414 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding gross negligence is the absence of care that is necessary under the circumstances); id. ("[Gross negligence] connotes the failure to exercise a slight degree of care." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); id. (stating that when people are so indifferent as to their conduct as not to give slight care to what they are doing, they are guilty of gross negligence); id. (holding gross negligence involves the intentional, conscious failure to do something that is incumbent upon one to do or "the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Etheredge, 341 S.C. at 312, 534 S.E.2d at 278 ("[T]he fact that the School District might have done more does not negate the fact that it exercised 'slight care.'"); S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 43-232(III)(B) (Supp. 2010) (providing the maximum class size for a seventh grade physical education class shall not exceed forty students per period per teacher). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.