THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Dominic Alexander Leggette, Appellant.

Appeal From Georgetown County
Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-203
Submitted March 1, 2012 – Filed March 28, 2012

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of Columbia; and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Dominic Alexander Leggette appeals his convictions of voluntary manslaughter and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State did not disprove self-defense.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) (stating an appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State on review of a denial of a directed verdict); id. ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499, 716 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2011) ("[W]hen a defendant claims self-defense, the State is required to disprove the elements of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt."); id. ("A person is justified in using deadly force in self-defense when: (1) The defendant was without fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) The defendant . . . actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in such imminent danger; (3) If the defense is based upon the defendant's actual belief of imminent danger, a reasonabl[y] prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the same belief . . . ; and (4) The defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing his own life or sustaining serious bodily injury than to act as he did in this particular instance."); State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 546, 500 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1998) (finding, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, that the State presented sufficient evidence to create a jury issue regarding self-defense); State v. Long, 325 S.C. 59, 63, 480 S.E.2d 62, 63-64 (1997) (holding a trial court properly refused to direct a verdict in defendant's favor based on self-defense when the evidence of self-defense was not conclusive but raised questions for the jury); State v. Strickland, 389 S.C. 210, 214, 697 S.E.2d 681, 683 (Ct. App. 2010) ("[U]nless it can be said as a matter of law that self-defense was established, it [is] not error for the trial court to submit the case to the jury.").

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.