Stephen C. Hucks, of Columbia, for Appellant. John S. Nichols, of Columbia, for Respondent.

In this domestic relations case, the Appellant posits the following issues: (1) did the family court err in refusing to award the Wife alimony based on the Husband's admission that he had committed adultery and had a history of alcohol abuse; (2) did the family court err in equitably apportioning the marital property; (3) did the family court err in denying Wife a divorce on the ground of the Husband's adultery and habitual drunkenness; (4) did the family court err in refusing to award Wife the entirety of her attorney's fees: (5) did the family court err in holding Wife in contempt for failing to surrender personal property and failing to execute deeds; and (6) did the family court err in granting Husband relief pursuant to Husband's motion for reconsideration under Rule 59, SCRCP.

Jarrel L. Wigger, of North Charleston, for Appellant. Margaret M. Urbanic and Michael B. McCall, of Charleston, for Respondent.

In this personal injury action, Appellant appeals the dismissal of her case for lack of prosecution based on her contention that the sanction of dismissal is too harsh under the facts and circumstances.

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, of Columbia, and Solicitor Cecil Kelly Jackson, of Sumter, for Respondent.

In this criminal case, Appellant was indicted for the offenses of criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree and committing a lewd act upon a minor. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of criminal sexual conduct with a minor; however, the Appellant was found guilty of committing a lewd act upon a minor. On appeal, Appellant present two issues: (1) whether the circuit judge erred by qualifying a police officer in the field of "forensic interviewing"; and (2) whether the circuit judge erred in refusing to allow testimony that the alleged child victim had lied in the past.

Harold P. Threlkeld, of Anderson, for Appellants. Mark Stan Meglic, of Greenville, and Stephanie Holmes Burton, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

H. William Chandler, d/b/a GME Engineering, brought this action against S&T Enterprises of Anderson, Inc., et al. after a dispute arose regarding the parties' contractual agreement for GME's professional consulting services. GME asserted claims for (1) foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, (2) breach of contract, and (3) unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of GME on its claim for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien and awarded GME a directed verdict as to counterclaims filed against it. S&T Enterprises et al. appeals.

J.R. Murphy, Adam J. Neil, and Tony Catone, of Columbia, for Appellant. Gene McCain Connell, Jr., of Surfside Beach, and Charles Bernhart Jordan, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondents.

This is an appeal of a decision on a declaratory judgment action brought by the South Carolina Municipal Insurance and Risk Fund to determine whether the South Carolina Municipal Insurance and Risk Financing Agreement provided coverage to the City of Myrtle Beach for refunds the City was ordered to make of money unlawfully collected by the City pursuant to a municipal ordinance requiring owners of rental or leased properties to pay outstanding water charges not covered by their tenants' deposits. The trial court determined the agreement provided coverage, holding (1) restitutionary refunds qualified as "damages" under the insuring agreement; (2) the wrongful collection of money constituted "property damage"; (3) the City's action pursuant to its ordinance was an unintended "occurrence" and (4) the takings exclusion did not operate to preclude coverage.

Acting Chief Attorney Joseph L. Savitz, III, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, of Columbia, and Solicitor Harold W. Gowdy, III, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

Kaye Blackwell appeals her conviction for possession of methamphetamine. Blackwell contends the trial court erred in allowing the primary arresting officer to testify Blackwell refused to help the police officer arrest other drug users or dealers. Blackwell argues the testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.

Richard C. Burke, of Charleston, for Appellant. Thomas A. Holloway, of Beaufort, for Respondents.

Michael Hill appeals from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration, arguing the trial court erred in failing to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act because there was a binding contract evidencing an intent to arbitrate any disputes arising under the contract.

Robert W. Cone, of Greenwood, for Appellant. D. Sean Faulkner, of Greenville; J. Calhoun Pruitt, Jr., of Anderson; and Harold P. Threlkeld, of Anderson, for Respondents.

This case arises from a disputed transfer of property to Jerry Andrew Meehan from his mother. John T. Meehan, Jerry Meehan's brother, and Appellant appeal the circuit court's dismissal of his actions for fraud, duress, undue influence, and constructive trust pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP.

S. Jahue Moore, of West Columbia, for Appellant. C. Cantzon Foster, II, of Columbia, for Respondents.

In this action arising from the dissolution of a corporation, Appellant, Grace Kelly, present the following two issues for appeal: (1) Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing to grant a new trial absolute after the jury first entered a verdict for Kelly but awarded no damages on her breach of fiduciary duty claim and then found in favor of Respondent, Donnie Elgin, when the trial court held the verdict was inconsistent and resubmitted the issue to the jury? (2) Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing to appoint a receiver and order an accounting with respect to the assets of the corporation at the time of Kelly's ouster, and by ordering that only the assets remaining at the time of trial be divided between the shareholders pro rata?

R. Wayne Byrd, of Florence, for Appellant. Timothy H. Pogue, of Marion, and Mary Duncan Shahid, of Charleston, for Respondent.

In this action involving the construction of a proposed landfill, Appellant appeals the circuit court's order denying his motion to enforce a settlement agreement with Respondent, which would enable him to proceed with his DHEC permit application. Appellant contends the circuit court erred in: (1) holding that Respondent had not taken any action that violated or breached the settlement agreement; (2) holding that Appellant's motion to enforce the settlement agreement was moot; (3) rejecting Appellant's proffer of testimony from two DHEC officials; (4) failing to find Respondent was estopped from taking any action that would interfere with Appellant's permit application; and (5) failing to find that Respondent's actions violated Appellant's equal protection rights.

George E. Graham, of Conway, for Appellants. Johnny Morant, of Georgetown, for Respondent.

Linda Green and Frank Green, III, appeal the order of the circuit court affirming the probate court's dismissal of their claims against the estate of Deloris Anderson for rents collected by Anderson and for fraud.

Donald L. Van Riper and Suzanne C. Boulware, of Columbia, for Appellants. William P. Walker, Jr., of Lexington, for Respondent.

These companion workers' compensation cases ask whether injuries incurred while employees were working on a personal vehicle on the job site during work time are compensable.

Cherie W. Blackburn, Ellis R. Lesemann, and Stephanie E. Lewis, of Charleston, for Appellant. Frampton Durban, Jr., of North Charleston, for Respondent. James C. Bradley, of Charleston, and Michael F. Bowler, III, of Charleston, for guardian ad litem.

In this appeal from an order terminating parental rights, Father argues the family court erred in finding Father's failure to visit and support his son was willful. Father also argues that termination of his parental rights would not serve his son's best interests, and that under the circumstances, Father's parental rights should not be terminated solely because his son has been in foster care for more than fifteen of the last twenty-two months. Finally, Father asserts that termination violates his constitutional right to due process.

Walter Hilton Barefoot, of Florence, for Appellant. Kenneth W. Harrell, of North Charleston; Stephen L. Brown and Wallace G. Holland, of Charleston; John S. Nichols, of Columbia, for Respondents.

Presents the question of whether an insurer properly terminated its coverage thereby relieving it from responsibility for the payment of benefits to an injured worker.

Edward L. Graham, of Florence, for Appellant. Charles A. Harris, Jr., of Cheraw, for Respondent.

This civil case arising out of an automobile accident raises numerous questions about the conduct of the trial, including limitations on juror voir dire, misuse of preemptory strikes, failure to give requested jury charges, and several evidentiary matters.

Charles E. Carpenter, Jr. and Francis M. Mack, of Columbia, for Appellants. William D. Robertson, III, and John D. Kassel, of Columbia, for Respondents.

This appeal raises issues of appealability from a standard Form 4 order and subsequent formal order, and the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act to a home inspection contract.

Edward E. Bullard, of Hilton Head Island, for Appellant-Respondent. Joseph R. Barker, of Hilton Head Island, for Respondent-Appellant.

This case, involving cross-appeals, concerns repair of a private road and maintenance assessments for a horizontal property regime. The regime argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment for the developer on the regime's request for a declaratory judgment that the amended restrictive covenants are invalid. The developer has also appealed and argues that the circuit court erred in denying summary judgment as to the regime's claim for recovery of funds it expended on road repair.

T. S. Stern, Jr., of Greenville, for Appellant. Beacham O. Brooker, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent.

In this appeal, the court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss, specifically analyzing whether a state agency's noncompliance with S.C. Code Ann. Section 29-6-250 and Section 57-5-1660(a)(2) (Supp. 2004) gives rise to a private right of action against the agency.