Appellate Defender Katherine H. Hudgins, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. John Benjamin Aplin, of Columbia, for Respondent.

In this criminal case, we determine (a) whether the probation judge violated the separation of powers by revoking Hicks' probation based, at least in part, on Hicks' alleged violation of a non-judicially imposed condition, (b) whether the probation judge violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by revoking Hicks' probation based, at least in part, on Hicks' alleged violation of the "Standard Sex Offender Conditions," which were not in place at the time of sentencing, and (c) whether the probation judge erred in altering the sentencing judge's order by adding all of the "Standard Sex Offender Conditions?"

Deputy Chief Counsel Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.

Day appeals his conviction for criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree contending the trial court erred in admitting a videotaped interview because the statements made therein constituted inadmissible hearsay. Day further argues the application of section 17-23-175 of the South Carolina Code violated the ex-post facto clause because the statute was enacted after the events that resulted in his conviction.

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Warren Blair Giese, of Columbia, for Respondent.

In this criminal case, we determine whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the law of self defense and accident. We are also asked to determine if the trial court improperly refused to grant a mistrial.

Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

Bryant appeals his convictions for criminal sexual conduct with a minor and lewd acts. He argues allowing videotaped interviews of children under section 17-23-175 of the South Carolina Code violated the ex-post facto clause because the statute was enacted after the events that resulted in his convictions.

J. Falkner Wilkes, of Greenville, for Appellant. Robert L. Waldrep, Jr., of Anderson, for Respondent.

In this domestic action, Samuel Edwards (Husband) appeals the family court’s order awarding Aletha Edwards (Wife) minimum wage income and permanent alimony. Additionally, Husband argues the family court erred in (1) finding his life estate relating to a produce stand was transmuted into marital property and (2) qualifying, and accepting the business valuation of, Wife’s expert witness.

Fred B. Newby and C. Leigh Andrew, of Myrtle Beach, for Appellants. David B. Miller and Robert S. Shelton, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondents.

In this breach of contract action, Jack Bodolosky and United Land-Magnolia, LLC (Bodolosky) appeal the trial court’s judgment in favor of C. Steve Clardy and Michael S. Clardy. Bodolosky argues the trial court erred by ordering him to carry out the terms of his contract with the Clardys and deliver title of real property to them. Bodolosky maintains there was no “meeting of the minds” between the parties to warrant enforcement of the contract. Finally, Bodolosky contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, and Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, III, of Florence, for Appellant. Henry Morris Anderson, Jr, of Florence, Respondent pro se.

In this appeal from a pre-trial grant of dismissal, the State asserts the trial court erred in limiting the territorial jurisdiction and authority of a Francis Marion University State Constable to the university grounds and roads contiguous to the campus.

Michael J. Giese, for Appellant. Larry Lee Plumblee and Curtis Warren Stodghill, of Greenville, for Respondent.

TALX Corporation (TALX) appeals from the trial court’s grant of Carl Stecker’s motion for a preliminary injunction. TALX argues the trial court erred in (1) finding the parties’ agreement prohibited him from pursuing counterclaims after Stecker commenced arbitration, (2) failing to give binding effect to two decisions of an arbitration panel, and (3) finding Stecker’s declaratory judgment an action for damages or injunctive and other equitable relief within the meaning of the parties’ agreement.

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender For Capital Appeals Robert M. Dudek, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Barbara R. Morgan, of Aiken, for Respondent.

Charles Q. Jackson appeals his conviction and thirty-year sentence for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime, arguing the circuit court erred in excluding evidence of his knowledge of the victim's violent history and in refusing to charge the jury on self-defense.

Mark Weston Hardee, of Columbia, for Appellant. H. Ronald Stanley, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Carolina Renewal, Inc. appeals the dismissal of its breach of contract action arguing the trial court erred in finding it was collaterally estopped from relitigating issues previously litigated in a slander action individually brought by its sole shareholder and officer. It contends the elements for collateral estoppel are not met because it was not a party to the previous action and this is a different cause of action.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Appellant. Appellate Defender Eleanor Duffy Cleary, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Respondent.

The State appeals from the trial court's order suppressing drugs seized by the police, arguing the trial court erred by (1) finding the officer's knock on the door of the motel room violated the Fourth Amendment and (2) suppressing the drugs seized by the officer pursuant to a valid consent to search.

Andrew Sims Radeker, of Columbia, for Appellant. John J. Hearn and Robert P. Wood, of Columbia, for Respondent. Stephen R. Suggs and Susan B. Berkowitz, of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae SC Appleseed Legal Justice Center.

Appellant challenges the denial of his motion for relief from a default judgment of foreclosure under Rule 60(B), SCRCP. Appellant contends that the total amount of debt stated in the judgment was false because the attorney fee award was substantially higher than the actual fee that Respondent paid its attorneys. Appellant also argues that the Master-in-Equity erred in concluding that he was barred from Rule 60(B) relief due to his failure to appeal the default judgment.

John Dwight Hudson, of Myrtle Beach, for Appellant. Allen Jeffcoat, of Myrtle Beach, Ezizze Davis Foxworth, of Loris, and James B. Richardson, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondents.

Larry and Teresa Fesmire brought this action for specific performance of an alleged oral contract with George Digh and his deceased wife, Shelley Digh, for the Fesmires’ purchase of the Dighs’ interest in a condominium. George Digh challenges the Master’s order granting specific performance on several grounds, including the following: (1) the admission of redacted settlement letters into evidence violated Rule 408, SCRE; (2) the action was barred by the Statute of Frauds, S.C. Code Ann. § 32-3-10(4) (2007); and (3) Larry Fesmire’s testimony regarding his negotiations with Shelley Digh violated the Dead Man’s Statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-20 (1985).

Richard C. Detwiler and Kathleen M. McDaniel, of Columbia, for Appellant. James T. McLaren and C. Dixon Lee, III, of Columbia, for Respondent.

In this civil case, Husband appeals (a) the family court's ruling that the Marital Settlement Agreement between him and Wife gives her share of the Husband's Tax Deferred Savings Plan plus any growth or loss on the entire account, (b) the family court's ruling that Husband has not purged himself of contempt from a prior family court order, and (c) the family court's awarding Wife attorneys' fees and costs.

David A. Wilson, of Greenville, for Appellant. Robert Scott Dover, of Pickens, for Respondent.

In this domestic matter, Husband asserts the family court abused its discretion in (1) approving and adopting the settlement agreement, (2) awarding an equal allocation of the marital property, and (3) awarding fractional interests in the parties' Miami property.

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster,Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh,Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.

On appeal from McCormick County, the Appellant was convicted of committing a lewd act against a minor. The original indictment, charged a single count of a lewd act against a minor, but alleged two distinct incidents, one in 2001 and another in 2003. The trial court ordered the indictment amended at which time the State elected to proceed only on the 2003 incident. Appellant claims it was error to allow the State to proceed under the amended indictment, alleging it was devoid of proper notice. Appellant also appeals the admission of the Victim's testimony regarding a previous encounter with the Appellant as a violation of rules 404(b) and 403, SCRE. Finally Appellant argues the trial court erred in allowing the Victim to testify as to her out of court statements made to a friend's mother regarding her alleged attack, arguing the statements are hearsay and impermissible bolstering.

A. Christopher Potts, of Charleston, for Appellant. Paul M. Platte and Katherine B. Barroll, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Appellant filed suit alleging four causes of action, including a claim for wrongful discharge. Initially, the Appellant allegedly agreed to dismiss all claims except the wrongful termination claim. Accordingly, an Order was entered granting summary judgment on all issues except the wrongful termination claim. Later, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment was renewed as to the wrongful termination claim, and was verbally granted, on the grounds that the consent to dismiss the other three claims barred the wrongful termination claim. Appellant immediately filed a Rule 54(b) motion to amend the previous Summary Judgment Order to reflect the intent of the parties to be able to maintain the wrongful termination claim. The Rule 54(b) motion to revise the first Summary Judgment Order was denied. Respondent then filed yet another summary judgment motion to dismiss the wrongful termination claim, which was granted. Appellant alleges (1) that it was error to grant Summary Judgment in favor of Respondent on the wrongful termination claim; (2) it was error to deny the rule 54(b) motion to revise the first summary judgment order; and (3) the initial Order granting summary judgment on three of the Appellant's claims did not bar Appellant's wrongful termination claim.

Robert Merrell Cook, II, of Batesburg-Leesville, for Appellant. Thomas Roy Young, Jr., of Aiken, and Ann McCrowey Mickle, of Rock Hill, for Respondent.

In this workers’ compensation case, the Uninsured Employers’ Fund (UEF) appeals from the circuit court’s order reversing the denial of compensation for injuries allegedly arising from a change of condition for the worse. UEF asserts the circuit court erred in failing to properly apply the substantial evidence rule to affirm the Appellate Panel’s finding that the claim for change of condition was barred by res judicata.

Michael Davis Moore, of Ridgeville, for Appellant. J. Reaves McLeod, of Walterboro, for Respondent.

This is an appeal of a directed verdict in a premises liability case. Padgett, the plaintiff, contends the trial court erred in improperly weighing competing testimony and evidence during his case-in-chief, thus improperly preventing the jury from determining whether the condition allegedly causing his injuries was open and obvious. Padgett further argues that, even if the condition was in fact open and obvious, the defendant, Colleton County, should have anticipated the harm and taken measures to warn or otherwise protect him from danger. Finally, Padgett alleges error in the trial court's reliance on the fact that the individual who created the dangerous condition was an independent contractor.

Samuel C. Weldon of Greenville, for Appellants. Kathryn Williams, of Greenville, for Respondent.

BMW Manufacturing Corporation appeals the Appellate Panel of the Worker's Compensation Commission's order awarding benefits to Robert K. McCuen and its finding he sustained a compensable neck injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with BMW.

Thomas William McGee, III and Erik T. Norton, of Columbia, for Appellant. J. Boone Aiken, III, of Florence, and James B. Richardson, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent.

Respondent Roberta Gibson brought this negligence action against Appellant Bank of America, seeking damages for allegedly unauthorized transactions in Georgia Mitchell’s accounts with Bank of America. The jury returned a verdict for Gibson on her negligence claim, and the trial court awarded Gibson prejudgment interest. Bank of America appeals the circuit court’s judgment on several grounds, including the following: (1) the negligence claim was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the negligence claim was barred by S.C. Code Ann. § 36-4-406(4) (2003); and (3) the circuit court erred in awarding prejudgment interest because the alleged damages were not sum-certain or capable of being reduced to certainty.

James H. Moss, of Beaufort, and H. Woodrow Gooding, of Allendale, for Appellant. Joesph O. Brennan and Marvin W. McGahee, of Savannah, GA, for Respondent Dr. H. Kohli. Hutson S. Davis, Jr., of Hilton Head Island, and Andrew R. Lindemann, of Columbia, for Respondent Dr. Phillip Zitello. Lindsay K. Smith-Yancey and Daniel S. McQueeney, Jr., of Charleston, for Respondents Hilton Head Healthsystems, P.A. d/b/a Hilton Head Regional Medical Center and Tenet Healthsystems of Hilton Head Inc.

In this medical malpractice action, Guinan appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment, arguing the court erred by (1) ruling on the summary judgment motion while substantial issues of discovery remained unresolved and (2) granting a general summary judgment for all defendants when Guinan's expert witness's testimony implicated the Hilton Head Regional Hospital by and through its agents in deviations from the standard of care.

E. Charles Grose, Jr, of Greenwood, Tara Schultz, of Rock Hill, Deputy Chief Appellate Defender for Capital Appeals Robert M. Dudek, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Roy Otis Tennant appeals his convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping, and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, arguing the trial court erred by (1) refusing to allow a doctor to testify about Tennant's mental illness; (2) excluding Tennant's suicide note; and (3) refusing to allow Tennant to question the victim and introduce evidence of their sexual relationship.

Stephen L. Brown and J. Rutledge Young, Jr., of Charleston, for Appellant. Elizabeth Applegate Dieck, of Charleston, Davis A. Whitfield-Cargile, of Charleston, and Carlisle Roberts, Jr., of Columbia for Respondent South Carolina Dept. of Health and Environmental Control. Cotton C. Harness, III, of Mt. Pleasant, for Respondents Boyce and Carol Miller.

This is a dock permit appeal. The appellant contends the Coastal Zone Management Appellate Panel erred in (1) declining to find the Administrative Law Court decided the case under the incorrect regulations, (2) declining to find the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management of the Department of Health and Environmental Control abused its discretion in issuing the permit, and (3) failing to find the Office of Oceanand Coastal Resource Management abused its discretion in not considering the cumulative effect of the proposed boat lift included in the permit.

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. John Benjamin Aplin, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Jennifer Bryant appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation based on her failure to pay restitution. Bryant alleges the trial court erred in: (1) failing to obtain a valid waiver of her right to counsel at the probation revocation hearing and (2) failing to find Bryant willfully failed to pay restitution.

Melinda Adelle Lucka, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellant. Otis Benjamin Peeples, Jr., and Phillip Ferderigos, of Charleston, for Respondent.

J. Kirkland Grant appeals the master-in-equity’s dismissal of his claims for takings and damages for loss of commercial rental income.