Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior Assistant Attorney General William Edgar Salter, III, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Harold W. Gowdy, III, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

In this criminal matter, John Brayboy appeals his murder conviction and forty year sentence in the death of his girlfriend. He argues the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter.

Allison Molony Carter, of Charleston, for Appellant. John E. Parker, of Hampton, for Respondent William Randy Crews, Employee. A. G. Solomons, Jr, of Estill, for Respondent W.R. Crews, LLC. Stephen L. Brown, Francis Drake Roger, and Russell G. Hines, of Charleston, for Respondents Architectural Railing & Grill & The Hartford , Carrier. Matthew C. Robertson and Latonya Dilligard Edwards, both of Columbia, for Respondent SC Uninsured Employers' Fund.

In this Workers' Compensation matter from Hampton County, the Appellant admitted the accident and injury to the Claimant, but alleged the policy had been canceled and Claimant had no coverage. In reversing the full Commission, the Circuit Court held the policy had not been properly cancelled and therefore Claimant was entitled to coverage. Appellant maintains the Circuit Court erred in: (1) reversing the Commission's finding that the policy had been properly cancelled; (2) finding the Claimant complied with audit requirements; (3) failing to find Appellant gave sufficient notice and reason for the cancellation of the policy; (4) failing to uphold the Commission's finding that Claimant's employer did not provide sufficient information to Appellant to determine if there existed unearned premium; and (5) failing to address Appellant's estoppel argument.

Mark A. Mason, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellant. Patricia O'Neill DeTreville, of Charleston, for Respondent.

Mother appeals the family court's imposition of $1,138 per month in child support arguing the family court erred in finding she was voluntarily underemployed and imputing income to her on that basis. Mother further argues the family court erred in considering the income from rental properties owned by her and her second husband in calculating her support obligations and in awarding Father attorney's fees.

C. Mitchell Brown, Steven A. McKelvey, and Thad W. Westbrook, of Columbia, for Appellant Southeast Toyota Distributors, LLC. John T. Lay, Jr. and John J. Pringle, of Columbia, for Appellants Anderson Columbia Aquisition, LLC. Manton M. Grier and Sarah P. Spruill, of Columbia, for Respondent Jim Hudson Superstore, d/b/a Jim Hudson Toyota. Joseph Gregory Studemeyer, of Columbia, for Defendant Dick Dyer, Inc. d/b/a Dick Dyer Toyota.

Southeast Toyota Distributors, LLC (SET) brought this declaratory judgment action to determine whether the relocation of the "Toyota Center" dealership in Lexington County is exempt from protest by competing dealers pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-15-46(C). Jim Hudson Superstore, Inc. (Hudson ) and Dick Dyer, Inc. filed counterclaims asserting their protests to the proposed relocation. SET and Hudson filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the exemption issue, and the circuit court granted Hudson's summary judgment motion. On appeal, SET challenges the circuit court's ruling that the proposed relocation is not exempt from protest.

David G. Jennings and James A. Bruorton IV, of Charleston, for Appellant. Andrew T. Shepherd and John G. Frampton, of Summerville, for Respondent.

The master-in-equity concluded Dorchester County could assess sewer service charges directly against Tranquil Properties, Inc. for its 40-unit townhome community which is serviced by a common sewer connection. Tranquil Properties appeals this ruling arguing the master-in-equity erred because county ordinances do not give authority to the county to assess an owner for a tenant's debts. Tranquil Properties further contends the master-in-equity misconstrued the title history of the property and the master's ruling does not provide an adequate remedy.

John C. Thomas and James Thomas Young, of Conway, for Appellant. Jeffrey E. Johnson and Jarrod M. McPherson, of Conway, for Respondent.

Appellant contends the special referee erred in concluding her uncle, the decedent, had testamentary capacity to change his will the day before his death and in failing to conclude the changes were not the result of undue influence.

William Norman Epps, III, of Anderson, for Appellant. Mary Jane Goodwin, of Anderson, for Respondent. Hugh Wingo Welborn, of Anderson, guardian ad litem.

Kirsten Leslie Barr, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellants. Kevin B. Smith and David T. Pearlman, of Charleston, for Respondent.

Westvaco Corp. appeals an order of the circuit court affirming the decision of the South Carolina Worker's Compensation Commission finding Westvaco liable to respondent's health insurance company for outstanding medical expenses. On appeal, Westvaco argues the Commission’s conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence in the record and the circuit court erred in failing to consider the jurisdictional issues resulting from respondent's death prior to the Commission’s final decision.

John J. Pringle, Jr. and Shaun C. Blake, of Columbia, for Appellant. Douglas Michael Zayicek, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondent.

Ned B. Majors appeals the dismissal of his breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims arguing the trial court erred in: (1) finding the assignment from Majors' corporation to himself was an improper circumvention of the rules prohibiting a corporate representation by a non-lawyer; (2) finding the agency contract was illegal and unenforceable; and (3) dismissing his equitable claim.

James Y. Becker and Mary M. Caskey, of Columbia, for Appellant. Gregory Milam Alford, of Hilton Head Island, for Respondent Ann T. Coffey. Steven R. Anderson, of Columbia, for Respondent Bank of America, N.A.

In this mortgage foreclosure action, Wachovia Bank, N.A., (Wachovia) and Ann T. Coffey (Coffey) filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the master-in-equity granted summary judgment to Coffey. On appeal, Wachovia challenges the master's conclusion that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to its causes of action for foreclosure and mortgage ratification. Wachovia argues that it provided proof of Coffey's knowledge of her late husband's execution of a mortgage on their home, even though the home was titled in Coffey's name only, and that she failed to repudiate the execution of the mortgage within a reasonable time. Wachovia also challenges the master's ruling that Wachovia's unjust enrichment claim required a showing that Coffey's conduct induced Wachovia to confer a benefit on her. Wachovia argues that the inducement element of an unjust enrichment claim no longer exists under South Carolina law.

Harry A. Hancock, of Columbia, for Appellant. John M. S. Hoefer and Tracey C. Green, of Columbia, for Respondent Alltel Communications.

The South Carolina Department of Revenue appeals an order of the Administrative Law Court granting summary judgment to the respondents and determining that respondents did not constitute telephone companies for the purposes of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-20-100. The Department contends that the court erred by: (1) incorrectly applying the plain and ordinary meaning of § 12-20-100; (2) overlooking the General Assembly's use of the term "telephone company" in all unrelated South Carolina statutes; (3) incorrectly ruling that § 12-20-100 is ambiguous; and (4) failing to give proper consideration to other issues raised under its jurisdiction.

Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J.Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General Alphonso Simon, Jr., of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor I. McDuffie Stone, III, of Bluffton, for Respondent.

Victor M. Sandoval-Hernandez appeals his conviction and sentence for murder, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.

David H. Cooley, of Myrtle Beach, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

In Re Spencer is a criminal case involving a young man under the age of seventeen where the family court found Spencer delinquent for pointing and presenting a firearm. On appeal, Spencer argues the family court erred in finding sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

Mary D. Shahid, of Charleston, for Appellant. Elizabeth Applegate Dieck and Davis Arjuna Whitfield-Cargile, of Charleston, for Respondent SCDHEC. Christopher M. Holmes, of Mt. Pleasant, for Respondent Jean Townsend.

James Bailey appeals from Administrative Law Judge's order, arguing (1) the judge erred in finding the dock is a "private recreational dock"; (2) the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control regulates the alteration and use of the State's critical areas; (3) the judge erred in failing to remand the permit application for consideration of the use of the proposed construction and the impact of the use on Bailey; and (4) Bailey has legal standing to contest the permit decision.

C. Lance Sheek, of Greenwood, for Appellant. LaDonna Sargent Johnson, of Greenwood, for Respondent.

In this appeal from the family court, the Court of Appeals must decide whether the family court erred in (1) granting a divorce based on physical cruelty to the wife while denying husband's request for a divorce based on adultery; (2) granting attorney's fees and costs to the wife; (3) awarding alimony to the wife; and (3) allocating 60% of the marital estate to the wife.

J. Falkner Wilkes, of Greenville, for Appellant. Jonathan Kirk Fisher, of Greenville, for Respondent.

In this appeal from the family court, the Court of Appeals must decide whether the family court erred in finding funds husband received from a Management Agreement with his employer were marital property, and in granting attorney's fee and costs to wife.

John E. North and Pamela K. Black, of Beaufort, for Appellants-Respondents. Joel D. Bailey, of Beaufort, for Respondents-Appellants.

In this cross-appeal, the Appellants-Respondents argue the circuit court erred in (1) applying the rules of construction applicable to restrictive covenants; (2) construing the term "developer"; (3) finding the undeveloped land was a part of the subdivision; (4) finding B. McNeal Partnership, L.P. was a "successor developer"; (5) finding the "developer' was entitled to continue to control the Association; (6) finding the "developer" was entitled to continue to control the architectural review board; and (7) failing to find the homeowners were entitled to pursue the claims of the Association derivatively and to seek attorney's fees. The Respondents/Appellants argue the circuit court erred in finding they were not entitled to attorney's fees.

Natasha M. Hanna, of Myrtle Beach, for Appellant. Robert J. Moran, of Murrells Inlet, for Respondent.

In this appeal, Tammy Maro argues the circuit court erred in (1) directing a verdict on her breach of contract and breach of contract acccompanied by a fraudulent act causes of action; (2) finding an exclusive right to sell agreement would not be upheld by this court; and (3) admitting evidence that was not provided to her prior to trial.

Darrell T. Johnson, Jr, of Hardeeville, for Appellant. R. Thayer Rivers, Jr, of Ridgeland, for Respondent.

In this civil case, the Court of Appeals determines whether the special referee erred in (1) refusing to set aside the default on the grounds of insufficient service of process; (2) finding Appellant made an appearance and waived service; (3) failing to set aside the judgment on the grounds the award was grossly disproportional; and (4) granting relief which constituted splitting attorneys fees with layman.