Jack B. Swerling, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Julie M. Thames, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Douglas A. Barfield, Jr, of Lancaster, for Respondent.

In this criminal matter from Fairfield County, Charles Carmack was convicted on four counts of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal, Carmack alleges the trial court erred in (1) refusing to sequester all the State's witnesses; (2) refusing to remove the jury foreman; (3) allowing the introduction of what Carmack argues was an involuntary statement; (4) failing to allow introduction of a document Carmack argues was admissible as record of regularly conducted business.

Brendan P. Langendorfer, of Charleston, for Appellant. Weston Adams, III, C. Edward Rawl, Jr., and Helen F. Hiser, of Columbia, for Respondent.

This is a foreclosure action. Appellant Wells Fargo Bank, who claimed a first priority mortgage lien on the subject property, challenges the findings by the master-in-equity that (1) there was a valid assignment of its interest to another lienholder; and (2) the first priority mortgage lien was capped pursuant to the terms of a promissory note between the mortgagor and the purported assignee.

Amanda A. Bailey and Henrietta U. Golding, of Myrtle Beach, for Appellant. George Hunter McMaster, of Columbia, for Respondents.

Timothy Wallace and several of his family members (the Wallaces) filed this action against Lynn Day, seeking damages for breach of a contract to purchase a condominium unit in the Camelot by the Sea Resort in Myrtle Beach. In the alternative, the Wallaces seek specific performance of the contract. Day filed a counterclaim for breach of contract as well as a summary judgment motion on her claim, which was denied. After the case was referred to the master-in-equity, the Wallaces filed a summary judgment motion, which the master granted. On appeal, Day challenges the order granting summary judgment to the Wallaces, arguing that the contract expired pursuant to its own terms because the Wallaces failed to close on April 6, 2005. Day also challenges the order denying her summary judgment motion, arguing that the Wallaces admitted that they were in default for failing to close on April 6, 2005.

Debra J. Gammons, of Charleston, for Appellant. Janis Richardson Hall, of Greenville, and Heath Preston Taylor, of West Columbia, for Respondent.

After the municipal court dismissed the City of Greenville's charge against McCollum for driving under the influence, the circuit court affirmed the dismissal. The City appeals, arguing the dismissal was improper because the City complied witih the disclosure requirements of Rule 5, SCRCrimP, and section 56-5-2953 of the South Carolina Code.

John S. Nichols, of Columbia, and John Eagle Miles, Sr, of Sumter, for Appellant. Kevin Kendrick Bell, of Columbia, for Respondent.

In this dispute over the termination of a life insurance policy, Donald M. Prince, the beneficiary and owner of the policy, appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Liberty Life Insurance Company, finding the statute of limitations barred the action. Prince argues his cause of action as beneficiary could not have accrued until the death of the insured and the fact that he is also the owner of the policy does not change that.

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Michelle Parsons, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

In this criminal matter, Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting two witness's hearsay statements through the investigating police officer, on the basis the statements explained the course of the investigation. Appellant further argues the trial court erred in denying his directed verdict motion in reliance on another witness's prior inconsistent statement when the statement was admitted for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness's trial testimony. Appellant also maintains photographs from a video surveillance camera were admitted in violation of the best evidence rule, and a witness's handwritten statement was admitted in violation of the Brady rule.

The following two cases will be heard jointly:

Terri Morrill Lynch, Matthew J. Story, Margaret M. Urbanic, of Charleston, and Latonya Dilligard Edwards, of Columbia, for Appellant. John S. Nichols, of Columbia, and Jarrel L. Wigger, of North Charleston, for Respondents.

The South Carolina Uninsured Employer's Fund appeals the order of the circuit court reversing the decision of the South Carolina Workers Compensation Commission denying benefits to Rajkumari Puniyani, mother of deceased employee Virendra Puniyani, and Dharmendra Chaudhari, husband of deceased employee, Anita Chaudhari. The Fund argues the circuit court erred in holding the Commission should have considered an affidavit obtained after the initial hearing and in ruling claimants had established the jurisdiction of the Commission regardless of the affidavit.

Terri Morrill Lynch, Matthew J. Story, Margaret M. Urbanic, of Charleston, and Latonya Dilligard Edwards, of Columbia, for Appellant. John S. Nichols, of Columbia, and Jarrel L. Wigger, of North Charleston, for Respondents.

Reynolds Williams and Walker H. Willcox, of Florence, for Appellants. William P. Hatfield, of Florence, for Respondents.

This matter arises out of the 2003 dissolution of Tidewater Land and Timber, Inc. ("Tidewater"), a corporation in which William C. Morris, Jr. ("William"), William Robert Morris ("Robert") and Leon E. Fonvielle, II ("Fonvielle") were the sole shareholders. William and Robert commenced an action against Tidewater and Fonvielle for an accounting. Tidewater and Fonvielle counterclaimed, contending that they were owed repayment for amounts withdrawn from Tidewater by William and Robert. On appeal, Tidewater and Fonvielle challenge the special referee's judgment awarding William and Robert each $90,897.35 and dismissing Tidewater and Fonvielle's counterclaim. They argue that the special referee erred by failing to find that William, Robert and Fonvielle agreed to use the proceeds from the sale of a tract of land in Orangeburg ("Orangeburg tract") to reduce Tidewater's debt. Alternatively, they claim that the special referee erred by finding that William and Robert were individually entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the Orangeburg tract because the tract was an asset of CRW, a partnership formed by William, Robert and Fonvielle that was not subject to the accounting action. Additionally, they contend that the special referee erred by excluding on hearsay grounds testimony by Scott Williamson regarding statements made to him by William about Tidewater's dissolution. Furthermore, they argue that the special referee erred by dismissing their counterclaim on the basis that Fonvielle agreed to forgive William and Robert's debts to Tidewater because William and Robert misrepresented to Fonvielle the amounts that they owed. Lastly, they argue that equity requires the reversal of the special referee's judgment.

John Benjamin Aplin, of Columbia, for Appellant. Eleanor Duffy Cleary, of Columbia, for Respondent.

The State appeals the circuit court's order finding that Ronald Garrard did not willfully violate the conditions of community supervision and was therefore not subject to electronic monitoring for life pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-540 (2008). The court further found that Garrard successfully completed the Community Supervision Program on February 29, 2008 and discharged his sentence pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-560. The State asserts that Garrard willfully violated the terms of the program and that the court abused its discretion when it failed to convene a hearing on Garrard's motion to reconsider, thus depriving the victim of her rights pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. 16-3-1560.

Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

In this criminal case, Danny Brown appeals his conviction for trafficking cocaine between 100 and 200 grams, arguing the trial judge erred in ruling the search in this case was lawful because the police officer was not justified in searching a potato chip bag that was contained in a duffel bag that was located on the sidewalk next to a car pulled over for an open container.

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R. J. Shupe, and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Bobbie Manigo appeals his order of commitment to the Department of Mental Health for long term control, care, and treatment for being a sexually violent predator, arguing the trial court erred in (1) denying his pretrial summary judgment motion because he was found not to be a sexually violent predator in 2004 just prior to his release from DOC and had committed no sexually violent offenses according to the Sexually Violent Predator Act since his release; (2) allowing the hearsay testimony of Dr. Crawford; and (3) not allowing defense counsel to call all of Manigo's witnesses which interfered with Manigo's ability to present a complete defense.

Dwight Christopher Moore, of Sumter, for Appellant. R. Hawthorne Barrett and Charles F. Moore, of Columbia, for Respondents.

In this appeal, Frank Peterson argues the circuit court erred in (1) granting summary judgment; (2) holding Peterson was an invitee on the Porter's property; (3) holding the Porters did not breach any duty owed to Peterson; (4) failing to include in its June 2, 2008 order those facts which the court found relevant, determinative of the issues, and undisputed sufficient to provide notice to Peterson as to the rationale applied in granting summary judgment; and (5) failing to address evidence that an employer-employee relationship existed between Peterson and the Porters.

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

Thomas Webb appeals his convictions for kidnapping, armed robbery, and first degree burglary, arguing the trial court erred in (1) allowing the State to refer to Webb as a "wild animal" in its opening statement and closing argument; (2) allowing the State to include facts about Webb's hair in its closing argument; and (3) not allowing defense counsel to fully cross examine Joy Hines and Officer Mann concerning co-defendant Randy Gaunt.

Russell F. Guest, Kevin P. Brady, of Greenville, and Tucker S. Player, of Columbia, for Appellants. John T. Crawford, Jr, of Greenville, for Respondents.

On appeal from this tort action, the Joe W. Miller and the Holly Woods Horizontal Property Regime argue the trial court erred in 1) allowing the Holly Woods Association of Residence Owners (the Association) to present a damages estimate from its expert witness; 2) denying their motions for directed verdict and judgment non obstante verdict; 3) submitting the verdict forms to the jury without separating out the respective defendants; 4) failing to grant a new trial due to an inconsistent verdict; 5) failing to grant a new trial as the verdict was excessive and unsupported by the evidence; 6) finding in favor of the Association on its equitable causes of action; 7) failing to grant a mistrial; and 8) allowing the Association to amend its compliant on the day of trial.

E. Ros Huff, Jr, of Irmo, for Appellants Lancaster Convalescent Center and Legion Insurance. Mark D. Cauthen, of Columbia, for Appellant S.C.Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association. Andrew Nathan Safran, of Columbia, for Respondents Kenneth and Keith Hudson as PR's for Estate of Frances S. Hudson. Ann McCrowey Mickle, of Rock Hill, for Respondent Matthew Deese. Pope D. Johnson, III, of Columbia, for Respondent Andrew Deese.

In this workers' compensation action, Lancaster Convalescent Center and Legion Insurance Company in liquidation through the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association appeal a circuit court order affirming the decision of the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission (Appellate Panel) to award Frances S. Hudson certain workers' compensation benefits.

Appellate Defender Lanelle C. DuRant, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, for Respondent.

In this appeal from the circuit court, we must determine whether the trial court erred in (1) not instructing the jury that the State had the burden of proof and the defendant had the presumption of innocence after the solicitor commented that the defendant did not dispute the legality of the stop or search when the defendant did not put up a case; (2) refusing to grant a mistrial when the solicitor commented on the defendant's outstanding arrest warrant during opening statements.

Heath Preston Taylor, of West Columbia, and A. Randolph Hough, of Columbia, for Appellant. General Counsel Frank L. Valenta, Jr., Deputy General Counsel Philip S. Porter, and Assistant General Counsel Linda Annette Grice, all of Blythewood, for Respondent.

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr., all of Columbia, and Solicitor Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.