Assistant Appellate Defender Tara S. Taggart, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, of Columbia, and Solicitor Warren Blair Giese, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Vincent Boseman appeals from his convictions for armed robbery, simple assault, and resisting arrest, arguing the trial court committed reversible error by incorporating into this retrial the pretrial proceedings and rulings that occurred during Boseman's previous trial on these charges.

Evans Taylor Barnette and L. Susan Foxworth, of Columbia, for Appellant. Joel W. Collins and Eric G. Fosmire, of Columbia, for Respondent.

NationsWaster and James Thomas Funderburk, Jr., appeal from the jury's verdicts in favor of R. Carlisle Roddey on his claims for civil conspiracy against both appellants, abuse of process and unfair trade practices act violation against NationsWaste, and mailcious prosecution, defamation/slander per se, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage against Funderburk.

Robert V. Mathison, Jr., of Hilton Head Island, for Appellant. Terry A. Finger, of Hilton Head Island, for Respondent The Beach Market, L.L.C. R. Nicholas Felix, of Hilton Head Island, for Respondent Lara Development Company, Inc.

This suit addresses the construction of the terms of a lease as it relates to the use of a pedestrian area outside of a restaurant that is the subject of the lease. It also involves injunctive relief and whether the lessor is barred from prohibiting certain uses that were permitted by the prior lessor.

Capers G. Barr, III, Charleston, and Gregory Milam Alford, of Hilton Head Island, for Appellant-Respondent. Charles H. Gibbes, Jr., of Charleston, for Respondents-Appellants Nick Rini and SunTrust Mortgage Corp.; Gale Carbone, of South Belmar, NJ, pro se; Thomas Holloway, of Beaufort, for Respondent-Appellant Doug Muraglia; Ralph E. Tupper, of Beaufort, for Respondent FedFirst Mortgage Corporation.

The special referee denied Rosenblum's request to subordinate the interests of other parties to a mortgage granted to Rosenblum by the Carbones and to foreclose the mortgage, finding Rini was an innocent purchaser for value without notice of any claim by Rosenblum. In addition, the referee ruled that Muraglia conspired with the Carbones to cheat Rosenblum and granted judgment in favor of Rosenblum for $269,500. Rosenblum appeals the denial of his foreclosure action. Muraglia appeals the judgment against him for civil conspiracy, arguing among other grounds that Rosenblum's action against him was barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel, and that the special referee lacked subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. Rini also appealed, seeking only to preserve a cross-claim against Muraglia in case of reversal by this court in Rosenblum's appeal.

Jack B. Swerling, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Attorney General Melody J. Brown, of Columbia, and Solicitor Ralph E. Hoisington, of Charleston, for Respondent.

Summersett appeals his conviction for murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, arguing the trial court erred in several of its evidentiary rulings.

Bert Glenn Utsey, III, of Walterboro, for Appellant. Peden B. McLeod, of Walterboro, and Andrew F. Lindemann, of Columbia, for Respondent.

This appeal concerns a challenge to the exercise of preemptory strikes in jury selection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky.

John S. Keffer, of Sumter, for Appellants-Respondents. Michael E. Kozlarek, of Columbia, for Respondents-Appellants.

This appeal arises from an order from a special referee requiring the Buonfortes to remove their garage, to change the gabled entrance to the mother-in-law wing of their home, and to pay for all the court costs and fees. After initially affirming the special referee's order in an unpublished opinion, our court granted the Buonfortes' petition for rehearing.

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior Assistant Attorney General William Edgar Salter, III, of Columbia, and Solicitor Druanne Dykes White, of Anderson, for Respondent.

Galbreath appeals his convictions for murder and possession of a firearm. He argues the trial court erred by (1) failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict and (2) by permitting the State to allow its reply witness to testify about Galbreath's statement to the police.

J. Michael Turner, of Laurens, for Appellant. H. Michael Spivey, of Mauldin, for Respondent Joseph Panther. Ron Avinger, of Woodruff, for Respondent Ron Avenger, pro se. Michael N. Duncan, for Respondents Michael Catto, Phillip Catto, and Catto Enterprises, Inc. Steven Michael Querin and Matthew E. Cox, of Spartanburg, for Respondent Carolina Southern Bank.

This case concerns a real estate transaction. On appeal, we must decide whether the trial court erred in holding (1) the Appellant was not entitled to judgment against Respondents under a theory of civil conspiracy; and (2) the Appellant was not entitled to a constructive trust being imposed on the subject property. We are also asked to consider whether these claims are barred under the theories of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

Timothy Alan Domin, of Charleston, for Appellant. Michael S. Fahnestock, of Charleston, for Respondent.

In this civil ction, the court determines the efficacy of an indemnification clause appearing on the reverse side of a "job ticket" signed subsequent to the job's completion.

Deborah Harrison Sheffield, of Columbia, for Appellant. Charles P. Summerall, IV, of Charleston, for Respondent.

This case involves the winding up of the affairs of a limited liability corporation. Mallon appeals the master-in-equity's order, arguing the master erred in: (1) limiting the scope of the action to one property owned by the LLC and not ordering an accounting; (2) granting Historic Charleston one-half of the proceeds from the sale of one property; (3) finding Mallon improperly disassociated from the LLC; (4) excluding evidence of Historic Charleston's self-dealing and misappropriation of funds; (5) awarding prejudgment interest where the amount due was not liquidated; and (6) awarding attorney's fees and costs.

William Holler, of Rock Hill, Appellant pro se. David Bradley Jordan, of Rock Hill, and Harold A. Oberman, of Charleston, for Respondent.

In this domestic relations case, the court analyzes the efficacy of a prenuptial agreement involving a citizen of the Ukraine (wife) and a citizen of the United States (husband). The family court concluded the prenuptial agreement was invalid, unenforceable, and unconscionable.

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, of Columbia, and Solicitor Thomas E. Pope, of York, for Respondent.

In this criminal case, appellant was convicted of two counts of intimidation of a witness. The charges of intimidation of a witness stemmed from appellant's writing letters from jail asking his daughter not to proceed with twelve counts of criminal sexual conduct charges. At trial, the circuit judge allowed only one of the criminal sexual conduct charges to be submitted to the jury. Appellant alleges error because this evidence placed his character in issue. The State avers that the underlying criminal sexual conduct charge was a part of the res gestae.

Todd Raymond Ellis, of Columbia, for Appellant. Robert McKenzie, and Gary H. Johnson, II, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Towne appeals, arguing the trial court erred in granting State Farm's JNOV motion because Towne was not judicially estopped from asserting at trial that the vehicle that caused her injuries was a "non-owned" vehicle under the State Farm policy.

Charles T. Deal, of Clemson, for Appellants. Edward R. Cole, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

Involves both a question as to the adequacy of a notice of a motion hearing and a statute of limitations issue.

William B. Jung, of Mt. Pleasant, for Appellants. Saul Gliserman, and O. Grady Query, of Charleston, for Respondents.

Appellants argue the trial court erred in granting a preliminary injunction that removed Appellants from possession and occupancy of their business leasehold and awarded possession of those premises to Respondents because (1) the Appellants were in actual possession of the building and had possession under color of right and (2) the decision to vacate the Appellants' lease was a legal issue for a jury's consideration and determination.

F. Barron Grier, III, of West Columbia, for Appellant. John F. Hardaway, of Columbia, for Respondent Russell Taylor d/b/a Palmetto Steel Construction. Daryl G. Hawkins, of Columbia, for Respondent Dana Rawls.

In this negligence and breach of contract case, Master Construction Company, Inc. appeals, arguing the trial court erred by (1) failing to dismiss the action based on the statute of limitations, (2) refusing to allow appellant's witness to testify, (3) directing a verdict of liability against appellant, and (4) denying appellant's motion to amend the pleadings.

James W. Bannister, of Greenville, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, of Columbia, and Solicitor Harold W. Gowdy, III, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

Williams appeals his convictions for trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of a firearm, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) trying him in absentia because he did not knowingly waive his right to be present at trial; (2) using Williams' uncounseled guility plea to a misdemeanor offense to enhance his sentence in violation of Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); and (3) sentencing him to trafficking second offense because the indictment only alleged trafficking first offense.