Demetri K. Koutrakos, of Columbia, for Appellants. Mary Maddison B. Langway and Thomas C. Brittain, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondent.

This appeal arises out of cross motions for summary judgment before the Master-In-Equity. The master granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent John Musick (Musick) and dismissed the action. Appellants Thomas L. Dicks and Robert E. Dicks, Jr. (Appellants) argue that the court erred in granting Musick's motion, in denying their motion, and in finding Appellants violated the restrictive covenants of the subdivision by further subdividing a 2.67 acre parcel.

Mark D. Chappell and W. Hugh McAngus, Jr., of Columbia, and David L. Hood, of Georgetown, for Appellant. Andrew F. Lindemann, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Darryl Sweetser was involved in a motor vehicle accident with an uninsured motorist. Sweetser argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor the South Carolina Insurance Reserve Fund (SCIRF) by concluding Sweetser's recovery for his uninsured motorist claim would be reduced by the amount of benefits he received in his workers' compensation claim.

Randall Scott Hiller, of Greenville, for Appellants. Stephen D. Baggett, of Greenwood, for Respondents.

The Walkers appeal the trial court's ruling upholding the Architectural Review Committee's (ARC) rejection of the location they submitted for the building of their house.

Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, for Respondent.

In this criminal case, Perry Strickland appeals his convictions for voluntary manslaughter and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, arguing the trial court committed error when it refused to grant a directed verdict in his favor.

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

The Court of Appeals must decide whether the circuit court committed reversible error at Reginald Lattimore's trial for failing to register as a sex offender when the circuit court (1) instructed the jury that Lattimore was convicted of committing a lewd act on a child despite a pre-trial stipulation that the jury would only be told Lattimore was convicted of a crime requiring him to register as a sex offender; (2) did not grant a directed verdict, despite the State's failure to establish Lattimore had notice of a new requirement for sex offender registration that was not in effect at the time of his indictment; and (3) excluded Lattimore's probation agent from testifying about not instructing Lattimore of the new registration requirements.

Walter Christopher Castro, of Myrtle Beach, for Appellant. William I. Diggs, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondent.

In this civil case, we must determine whether the trial court erred in denying Jose Reyes's motion to set aside default judgment when, according to Reyes, Respondent's counsel elected to notify Reyes personally despite knowing that Reyes was represented by counsel.

Senior Appellate Defender Joseph L. Savitz, III, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Deborah R. J. Shupe, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

Charles Wesley Lawrimore appeals his conviction and sentence for abuse or neglect of a vulnerable adult pursuant to Section 43-35-85(F) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2009), arguing the circuit court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict and in allowing the lead investigator to testify to the competency of the victim in violation of Rule 702, SCRE.

Charles L. Henshaw, Jr., of Columbia, and Benjamin Mabry, of Columbia, for Appellant. Ashby W. Davis, Steven A. Snyder, David L. Williford, and Collie W. Lehn, Jr., of Greenville, for Respondent David Mark Countryman, M.D. H. Spencer King, of Spartanburg, for Respondent Piedmont Surgical Associates of York County, P.A. Edward G. Smith, of Spartanburg, for Respondent Rajesh Hari Kedar, M.D. & Metrolina Medical Association. Robert H. Hood, of Charleston, for Respondent Robert Paul Neueton Mingus, M.D.

In this medical malpractice case from York County, the appellant appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of various respondents. The appellant alleges the grant of summary judgment was error because, (1) there exists a material issue of fact as to whether the respondents deviated from generally recognized and accepted standards of medical care, (2) it was granted upon grounds not raised in the motion, (3) the trial court improperly determined the appellant's expert witness did not testify to proximate cause with the requisite certainty, and (4) the trial court improperly found the appellant's expert testimony failed to establish a standard of care for an anesthesiologist.

Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Jerry W. Peace, of Greenwood, for Respondent.

Rita Bixby was convicted of conspiracy and two counts of accessory before the fact of murder. Bixby appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in admitting statements made by Steven Bixby to third parties as statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy under Rule 801(2)(E), SCRE and in admitting letters Steven Bixby wrote to third parties. Bixby also contends that the trial court failed to provide the jury with adequate limiting instructions.

William R. Calhoun, Jr. and David M. Ratchford, of Columbia, for Appellant. Larry Dwight Floyd, Jr, of Columbia, for Respondent.

In the appealed order, the circuit court affirmed a summary court order dismissing McNair's application for ejectment. McNair appeals, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in de facto rewriting the parties' contract to make it a twenty-year lease rather than a five-year lease with an option for three renewals, (2) the circuit court failed to give due consideration to relevant statutory law, (3) the circuit court relied on case law that was distinguishable from the present controversy rather than on a case that was directly on point, (4) the circuit court erred in considering parole evidence, and (5) the circuit court should not have decided the case on equitable grounds.

Ellen M. Adams, Christian Stegmaier, and Amy L. Neuschafer, of Columbia, for Appellant. Danny Allen, of Spartanburg, for Respondent Chad Randall Foster. Stanley T. Case, of Spartanburg, for Respondent Old American Lumber, LLC. C. Roland Jones, Jr, of Spartanburg, for Respondent SC Uninsured Employers Fund.

The workers’ compensation carrier appeals the Commission’s ruling that cancellation of coverage is an affirmative defense which must be pled in a Form 51, and is waived when the carrier enters only a general denial.

Kenneth E. Sowell, of Anderson, for Appellants. H. Lee Herron, of Florence, for Respondent.

In this divorce action, Raymond Pruitt (Husband) and Karen Leigh Pruitt, Husband's sister (Sister), challenge the family court's final decree divorcing Karen B. Pruitt (Wife) from Husband. They contend that the family court erred in: (1) finding that Sister made no loan to Husband to support his business and to finance improvements to the home he owned prior to the marriage and used as the marital residence; (2) characterizing gifts from Husband's family as marital property; (3) concluding that the marital residence was transmuted into marital property; and (4) finding that Husband's adultery was the sole reason for the breakup of the marriage and in using this finding as a basis for awarding a greater percentage of the marital assets to Wife.

James A. Blair, III and Kristen E. Small, of Greenville, for Appellants-Respondents. Harold P. Threlkeld, of Anderson, for Respondent-Appellant.

On appeal, Robert and Susan Coake argue the trial court erred in granting Kathleen Burt's motion for a directed verdict on their cause of action for violation of the Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act. Kathleen Burt cross-appeals and maintains the trial court erred in failing to award her attorney's fees.

Emily G. Johnston, of Mt. Pleasant, and Donald Bruce Clark, of Charleston, for Appellant. Stephanie Pendarvis McDonald, of Charleston, for Respondent.

In this domestic action, Pamela Buck argues the family court erred in entering a judgment against her for $336,210 or $262,000 when there was no factual or legal basis for a judgment in any amount other than $152,000.

Robert Clyde Childs, III, of Greenville, and J. Falkner Wilkes, of Greenville, for Appellants. Fred W. Suggs, III, of Greenville, for Respondent.

In this tort action, a jury found Benjamin Scott Few and Few Farms, Inc., (Few) liable to Kenneth B. Jenkins for damage to his truck and lost profits. On appeal, Few maintains the trial court erred in failing to grant his motions for directed verdict, in failing to reduce actual damages, in qualifying an expert witness, and in failing to reduce punitive damages.

James S. Gibson, Jr. and Mary B. Lohr, of Beaufort, for Appellant. Terry Wayne Yarbrough, of Bluffton, for Respondent.

In this action pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, Beaufort Memorial Hospital appeals the trial court's decision declaring certain contents of its Quality Assurance Committee's file discoverable and ordering a new trial.

James H. Moss, of Beaufort, for Appellant. Dawes Cooke, Jr. and Lucinda Gardner Wichmann, of Charleston, for Respondent.

Fletcher appeals the grant of directed verdict in favor of MUSC on her medical malpractice claims for negligence in the performance of her subclavian bypass surgery and for performing the procedure without adequately advising her of the associated risks.

Vernon F. Dunbar, of Greenville, for Appellants. Kathryn Williams, of Greenville, for Respondent.

In this workers' compensation case, we must determine whether the circuit court, acting in its capacity as appellate court, erred in reversing the workers' compensation commission's finding that Crisp did not suffer a physical brain injury.