Jan L. Warner and Mathew E. Steinmetz, both of Columbia, for Appellant-Respondent. Yulee Harrelson and Thomas Neal, III, both of Columbia, and G. Murrell Smith, Jr., of Sumter, for Respondent-Appellant.

In this custody dispute, Emily Smith (Mother) contends the family court erred in refusing: (i) to deviate from the child support guidelines and charge Jeffrey Smith (Husband) with his share of private school tuition for the parties' minor child; (ii) to require Husband to obtain life insurance as security for the family court's awards of alimony and child support; (iii) to consider the cost of Wife's medical insurance and medical expenses as an incident of alimony; (iv) to find property given to Husband by his mother had been transmuted into marital property; and (v) to award Wife attorney's fees and costs. In his cross-appeal, Father claims the family court erred in: (i) setting the visitation schedule; (ii) granting Mother the authority to deny visitation for good cause; (iii) refusing to allow daily phone contact between he and the child; (iv) failing to permit the child to fly unaccompanied to visit him; and (v) refusing to impute income to Mother.

Lewis Lanier, of Orangeburg, for Appellant Sunshine Recycling. Robert Merrell Cook, II, of Batesburg-Leesville, for Appellant SC Uninsured Employer's Fund. Preston McDaniel, of Columbia, for Respondent Lee B. Jeffrey, Sr. Grady L. Beard and Daniel W. Hayes, of Columbia, for Respondent Capital City Insurance.

Sunshine Recycling (Sunshine) and the South Carolina Uninsured Employers' Fund (UEF) appeal the circuit court's reversal of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's (the Commission) finding that Capital City Insurance (Capital City) was the workers' compensation insurance carrier for Sunshine at the time of claimant Lee B. Jeffrey, Sr.'s injury. Specifically, Sunshine and UEF argue the circuit court erred in: (1) incorrectly applying the substantial evidence rule; (2) failing to give proper deference to the Commission's coverage determination when that determination is exclusively within the purview of the commission per Labouser v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co.; and (3) failing to find as an additional sustaining ground for upholding the Commission's coverage determination that Capital City was estopped to deny coverage.

Robert Wyndham, of Charleston, for Appellant-Respondent. James Richardson, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent-Appellant.

In this cross-appeal, David Adams and Dennis Rhoad appeal the circuit court's order affirming the probate court's award of attorneys' fees to Adams. Adams argues the circuit court erred in: (1) substituting its own view of the preponderance of the evidence concerning the amount of a reasonable attorneys' fee for that of the probate court; and (2) concluding that this is an equitable matter and not an action at law. Rhoad argues the circuit court erred in: (1) finding that the prior circuit court order was controlling as the law of the case; (2) finding that the prior court order required an award of attorneys' fees; (3) awarding attorneys' fees where the contingencies of the written fee agreement were not met prior to the attorney abandoning the contract as a result of being disbarred; and (4) failing to find Adams' claim for attorneys' fees is barred pursuant to the unclean hands doctrine.

Charles Edward Johnson, of Columbia, for Appellant. C. Edward Rawl, Jr., and Weston Adams, III, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Nelson Padgett appeals the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Greenwood (City). Padgett asserts there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his arrest was supported by probable cause. Specifically, Padgett contends the genuine issue of material fact stems from "the securing of the arrest warrants in the first instance." The City argues the circuit court properly granted its motion for summary judgment. The City contends even if the circuit court erred in dismissing Padgett's case, the City is immune from liability under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.

Bernard Fielding, of Charleston, for Appellants. John Massalon, of Charleston, for Respondent.

In this appeal arising from the same probate action as #17401, Connor and Austin appeal the circuit court's order affirming actions taken by the probate court after the filing of their initial appeal. Issues on appeal include the proper standard of review, pleading requirements, breach of fiduciary duty, probate court jurisdiction during pendency of an appeal, and due process.

Bernard Fielding, of Charleston, for Appellants. John Massalon, of Charleston, for Respondent.

Leroy Connor and Yvonne Austin (collectively Appellants) appeal the circuit court's orders affirming the probate court's disposition of the estate of their mother, Margaret S. Connor (Margaret), arguing the circuit court erred in affirming the sale of Margaret's funeral home business and property, in awarding attorney's fees, in refusing to allow Appellants' collateral attack, and in failing to recognize Appellants' priority of appointment as Margaret's conservators and the personal representatives of her estate.

Stacey T. Meyer, Stephen B. Samuels, Joseph R. Dasta, and John S. Nichols, all of Columbia, for Appellant. Carmelo Sammataro and Michael Chase, both of Columbia, for Respondents.

Carol Ervin appeals from the circuit court's order affirming the decision of the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission, arguing the court erred in failing to find: (1) her injury was a compensable injury by accident within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act; and (2) her injury arose out of her employment at the hospital.

Deputy Chief Attorney for Capital Appeals Robert M. Dudek, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Attorney General William Edgar Salter, III, of Office of the Attorney General, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Donald Myers, of Lexington, for Respondent.

Gene Cooper appeals his convictions for murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and kidnapping, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) denying Cooper's motion to dismiss the charges against him because his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) finding Phillip Farmer was an unavailable witness and allowing Farmer's prior testimony to be read into the record because it denied Cooper his constitutional right to confront the witness against him and was prejudicial; and (3) ruling Cooper could be impeached with his 1977 convictionos for housebreaking and grand larceny because the convictions were too remote and were highly prejudicial.

Jan Warner, of Columbia, for Appellant. Kermit King, Mary Katherine Sherman,Tina Cundari, and Rebecca West, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

This is an appeal of a divorce decree. Appellant alleges various factual and legal errors, specifically: failure to make adverse findings of fact against Respondent as to his marital fault and credibility, failure to grant a divorce based on desertion, and failure to find Respondent's interest in various business ventures had transmuted or that Appellant was entitled to a special equity interest therein. Appellant also avers the family court erred in reducing the amount of life insurance Respondent was required to carry, as well as maintains she is entitled to a larger award of permanent periodic alimony and attorney's fees. Finally Appellant argues that the family court erred in failing to disqualify one of Respondent's attorneys.

Charles V. Leonard, of Myrtle Beach; Jeffrey D. Wait, of Saratoga Springs, NY; and Steven P. Curvin, of Buffalo, NY, for Appellant. Douglas Charles Baxter, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondent Bryan J. Smith. Gene McCain Connell, Jr., of Surfside Beach, for Respondent Brandon Leggett.

In this appeal from a declaratory judgment action, New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company appeals the trial court's ruling that the court had personal jurisdiction over the New York company and the company provided coverage for the accident at issue.

Timothy Clay Kulp, of Charleston, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior Assistant Attorney General William Edgar Salter, III, of Office of the Attorney General, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.

In this appeal from Charleston County, the Appellant appeals his conviction on charges of murder, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and first degree burglary. Appellant alleges error in: (1) the trial court’s failure to suppress DNA evidence recovered from the victim because the State could not establish whether the DNA was deposited/left in the victim during the time period in which the alleged crimes occurred; (2) in the trial court’s qualification of the State’s witness, Prodan, as an expert and admitting his testimony; (3) in the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial based on the State’s failure to disclose allegedly exculpatory evidence; and (4) in failing to grant Appellant’s motion for directed verdict on all charges.

Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General Melody J. Brown, of Office of the Attorney General, of Columbia, and Solicitor Cecil Kelly Jackson, of Sumter, for Respondent.

In his appeal from convictions for murder and failing to stop for a blue light, Eric John Ridel asserts the court erred in various evidentiary rulings.

Natale Fata, of Surfside Beach, for Appellant. Desa Ballard and Stephanie Weissenstein, of West Columbia, and J. Jackson Thomas, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondents.

Plantation A.D., LLC appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Gerald Builders and Jimmy Gerald in which the trial court found a memorandum of agreement was not binding because it was not supported by valuable consideration and two conditions precedent had not occurred.