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Supreme Court Seal
South Carolina
Judicial Department
24797 - In the Matter of Roberts

Davis Adv. Sh. No. 20
S.E. 2d


In The Supreme Court

In the Matter of Jeffrey

Kim Roberts, Respondent.

Opinion No. 24797

Submitted April 30, 1998 - Filed June 1, 1998


James C. Anders, of Columbia, for respondent.

Henry B. Richardson, Jr., and Senior Assistant

Attorney General James G. Bogle, Jr., both of

Columbia, Disciplinary Counsel.

PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter,

respondent and disciplinary counsel have entered into an agreement under

Rule 21, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. In the agreement, respondent admits

misconduct and consents to be disbarred from the practice of law. We

accept the agreement.

In July 1997, respondent, while employed as a deputy solicitor

for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, requested or agreed to accept sexual favors

from a female defendant in exchange for dismissing a charge of driving

under the influence. Respondent was indicted by the State Grand Jury for

acceptance of a bribe in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-220 (1985) in

August 1997. Thereafter, respondent was placed on interim suspension.

In the Matter of Roberts, 327 S.C. 261, 489 S.E.2d 480 (1997). The State

Grand Jury later indicted respondent for three counts of criminal sexual

conduct in the third degree, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-654

(1985). Respondent subsequently pled guilty to one count of acceptance of

a bribe and one count of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree and

was sentenced.

These crimes are serious crimes as defined by Rule 2(z), RLDE,

since the circumstances of their commission adversely reflect on



respondent's honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer.

Additionally, acceptance of a bribe for the dismissal of criminal charges is

a crime of moral turpitude. See In the Matter of Davis, 270 S.C. 262, 241

S.E.2d 895 (1978) (Court held that magistrate who entered pleas to several

charges including acceptance of a bribe committed crimes of moral

turpitude). Furthermore, we now hold that the commission of criminal

sexual conduct in any degree is a crime of moral turpitude. Cf. State v.

McFarlane 279 S.C. 327, 306 S.E.2d 611 (1983) (criminal sexual conduct

with a minor in any degree is a crime of moral turpitude); State v. Jones,

271 S.C. 287i, 247 S.E.2d 43 (1978) (assault with intent to rape is a crime

of moral turpitude). By being convicted of these serious crimes that are

also crimes of moral turpitude, respondent has committed misconduct

under Rule 7(a)(4), RLDE. Finally, respondent has engaged in conduct

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of

Rule 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR.

Accordingly, we disbar respondent from the practice of law.

Respondent's request to make this disbarment retroactive to the date of

his interim suspension is denied. Within fifteen days of the date of this

opinion, respondent shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing

that he has complied with Rule 30, RLDE.