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The summary following each opinion is prepared to offer lawyers and the public a general overview of what a particular opinion decides. The summary is not necessarily a full description of the issues discussed in an opinion.
3-6-2013 - Opinions
Husband's estate appeals from the final order of the family court granting Wife a divorce, equitably dividing the parties' property, and awarding alimony to Wife. Husband argues the family court erred in awarding Wife the benefit of his survivor's benefit plans. We affirm.
3-13-2013 - Opinions
Francis Larmand appeals his convictions for second-degree lynching, conspiracy, and pointing and presenting a firearm. He argues the trial court erred in: (1) submitting his written charge to the jury; (2) not directing a verdict on the charges of lynching, conspiracy, and pointing and presenting a firearm; and (3) charging the jury it may infer all persons who were present as members of a mob when an act of violence was committed are guilty as principals. We reverse.
UniHealth Post Acute Care and its workers' compensation insurance carrier appeal the workers' compensation commission's decision awarding Susan Davis temporary total disability compensation. UniHealth argues the commission erred when it (1) determined Davis did not constructively refuse suitable employment; and (2) reinstated temporary compensation that UniHealth had previously agreed to pay. We affirm.
3-20-2013 - Opinions
Roosevelt Simmons appeals the master's grant of summary judgment in favor of Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc. and St. John's Water Company, Inc. in this case regarding utility easements and trespass claims. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
This appeal arises out of four separate orders for bond estreatment. On appeal, Appellants A AAA Bail Bonds, American Surety, and Bankers Insurance (collectively "Appellants") argue that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring the clear and unambiguous language of South Carolina Code section 17-15-170 (Supp. 2012) and ordering estreatment; (2) the trial court's orders of estreatment are based upon errors of law; (3) the State's efforts to estreat the bonds are barred by the equitable doctrine of laches; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the factors in Ex parte Polk, 354 S.C. 8, 579 S.E.2d 329 (Ct. App. 2003) prior to ordering estreatment.
Ronnie F. Judy appeals the special referee's order setting aside several conveyances as violating the Statute of Elizabeth. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Robert and Annette Reeping appeal the master's order denying their request to set aside the tax sale of their property. We reverse.
3-27-2013 - Opinions
In this workers' compensation case, Thomas Brown appeals, arguing (1) the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (Appellate Panel) erred by (a) not granting him lifetime medical care for his lower back problems, (b) not raising the compensation rate to $591.73, and (c) not writing its order; and (2) the Court of Appeals erred by denying Brown's motion for leave to present additional evidence to the Workers' Compensation Commission pursuant to section 1-23-380(3) of the South Carolina Code.
D. Michael Taylor, who purchased a piece of real property in Aiken County on September 7, 2010, appeals the Administrative Law Court's finding that Taylor lacked standing to challenge the 2010 property appraisal and assessment for tax purposes because he did not hold title to the property on December 31, 2009, when the tax was levied. We reverse and remand.
Gregory Brown brought this action for partition of real property that he and his five siblings owned together, and for an accounting of expenses he paid to preserve the property. The master-in-equity ordered the five siblings to pay Gregory their share of the expenses, partitioned the property by sale rather than in kind, and awarded Gregory attorney's fees and costs. The siblings appeal those decisions. We affirm the accounting decision, reverse the partition decision, vacate the award of fees and costs, and remand.
This appeal arises out of personal injury claims resulting from a car accident. On appeal, Appellant Amy Wiquist argues that the trial court erred in denying her motions to set aside default judgment because: (1) the affidavits failed to comply with statutory requirements; (2) service by publication violated Wiquist's due process rights; (3) evidence of fraud or collusion existed; (4) the Yates v. Gridley, 16 S.C. 496 (1882), line of cases should be overruled; and (5) the orders of service by publication did not comply with section 15-9-740 of the South Carolina Code (2005). We reverse and remand.
In this design defect case, Nissan asserts the circuit court erred in denying its motion for JNOV because the jury found that Miranda C. had not proven the existence of a feasible alternative design. On cross-appeal, Miranda C. argues the circuit court erred in denying her motion to invalidate a post-verdict special interrogatory and erred in granting Nissan's motion for a new trial. We affirm.
Krystal Chisolm appeals the administrative suspension of her driver's license. On appeal, Chisolm argues the Administrative Law Court (ALC) erred by (1) interpreting the term "refusal" in section 56-5-2951 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2012) in accordance with the State Law Enforcement Division's (SLED) policies and procedures, and (2) finding she refused the breath test. We reverse.
This appeal arises out of Appellant Shawn Humble's driving under the influence (DUI) arrest. On appeal, Humble argues the circuit court erred in reversing the municipal court's dismissal of the DUI charge because (1) the affidavit required by section 56-5-2953 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2012) is deficient on its face, and (2) the circuit court ignored the factual finding of the municipal court that Respondent City of Greer's (the City) efforts to maintain the video recording equipment in an operable condition were not reasonable. We reverse the circuit court and reinstate the municipal court's order of dismissal.