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The summary following each opinion is prepared to offer lawyers and the public a general overview of what a particular opinion decides. The summary is not necessarily a full description of the issues discussed in an opinion.
2-7-2018 - Opinions
Teresa Davis appeals her convictions of first-degree burglary and possession with intent to distribute (PWID) methamphetamine, second offense, for which the trial court sentenced her to a cumulative term of eighteen years' imprisonment. On appeal, Davis argues the trial court erred by (1) denying Davis's motion to sever her charges, (2) refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal where the State failed to present evidence showing Davis had control over the drugs found in the vehicle, and (3) refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal because the State failed to introduce any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence that the home was occupied, for the purposes of qualifying as a "dwelling," at the time of the alleged burglary. We affirm.
In this action Clair Craver Johnson appeals the circuit court's entry of summary judgment in favor of John Roberts, M.D. and the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) (collectively Respondents). Johnson asserts the circuit court erred in finding her claims were time barred by the statute of repose applicable to medical malpractice claims. We reverse.
2-14-2018 - Opinions
In this action to quiet title to a property sold at a tax sale, Mary Ravenel appeals the trial court's finding the tax sale of her property valid. Ravenel contends (1) the trial court erred in failing to take testimony; (2) the tax sale was void because the property was not levied, advertised, and sold in the name of the true owner; (3) judicial estoppel does not apply because Ravenel was not a party to the previous action; and (4) the delinquent tax collector did not comply with statutory requirements in sending notice to Ravenel. We affirm as modified.
Denzel Heyward appeals his convictions for attempted murder, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Heyward argues the trial court erred in (1) admitting a photo lineup identification into evidence; (2) admitting evidence of domestic violence by Heyward against a witness; and (3) commencing sentencing proceedings at 1:30 a.m. and permitting victim impact testimony unrelated to the crimes for which Heyward was convicted. We affirm.
2-21-2018 - Opinions
Benjamin Gecy appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of South Carolina Bank & Trust (Bank), Jaime Hamner, and Deborah Hamner (collectively, the Hamners), arguing summary judgment was improper because material questions of fact exist as to whether Bank intentionally interfered with the contracts between the Hamners and Gecy, whether the Hamners breached their contracts with Gecy, and whether Bank and the Hamners made negligent misrepresentations. Gecy further asserts the circuit court erred in declining to continue the summary judgment hearing so Gecy could compel discovery responses and take additional depositions. We affirm.
We affirm the grant of summary judgment on Mims' claims for violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. However, we reverse the circuit court's dismissal and grant of summary judgment on Mims' claims for violations of § 1983 against Respondents Lacy and Butkus, and negligence, gross negligence, and negligent supervision against DDSN. Mims' lawsuit commenced on the date his amended complaint was filed, May 7, 2008, and he may receive the benefit of a five year tolling of the statute of limitations for each of his claims under section 15-3-40 of the South Carolina Code. Finally, we find the circuit court erred in limiting the scope of Mims' lawsuit. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
2-28-2018 - Opinions
In this criminal appeal, Gerald Rudell Williams appeals his convictions for attempted murder, arguing the circuit court erred in (1) refusing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of first-degree assault and battery, and (2) charging the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent. We affirm.