Melvin R. Hutson, of Greenville, for Appellant. James L. Rogers, Jr., and Zandra L. Johnson, both of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, of Greenville, for Respondents.

The issue is whether the master fashioned an appropriate remedy to abate a surface water runoff problem.

Harry T. Heizer, of Irmo, for Appellant. General Counsel Charles Hillard Sheppard, Jr., and Assistant General Counsel Rachel Donald Erwin, both of South Carolina Department of Public Safety, of Blythewood, for Respondent.

This is a direct appeal concerning the ability of an arresting officer to prosecute a driving under the influence case once he later transfers to another law enforcement agency.

Charles A. Krawczyk, William R. Padget and Robert "Sam" Phillips, all of Finkel Law Firm, of Columbia, for Appellants. John L. McCants, of Ellis, Lawhorne & Sims, of Columbia, for Respondent.

This is a direct appeal in a civil action arising out of moisture damage to a home due to alleged design defects and negligent construction. On appeal, Appellants challenge several of the trial court’s rulings regarding the admission of expert testimony, the admission of testimony challenging the amount Appellants spent on repairs prior to trial, and the law charged to the jury regarding a general contractor’s duty of care. Appellants also allege that the trial court erred in directing a defense verdict on Appellants’ cause of action for strict products liability.

Edward L. Graham, of Florence, for Petitioner. T. McRoy Shelley, III, of Rogers Townsend & Thomas, of Columbia, and Cynthia Burns Polk, of State Accident Fund, of Columbia, for Respondents.

In this workers' compensation case, the claimant appeals the denial of benefits for her mental-mental injury based on extraordinary and unusual conditions of employment.

Harry A. Swagart, III, of Columbia, for Petitioner. Lawrence W. Johnson, Jr., of Columbia, and W. Duvall Spruill, of Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney, of Columbia, for Respondent.

This is a Court of Appeals certiorari. At issue is whether the Court of Appeals properly reversed the grant of summary judgment in petitioner Gregg’s favor, on the questions of whether Gregg’s personal guaranty obligations were properly revoked in 1992 and whether Gregg’s notice in 1998 was sufficient to revoke the guaranty.

Jennifer J. Miller and James G. Carpenter, both of The Carpenter Law Firm, of Greenville, for Appellant. Shelly Bezanson Kelly, of South Carolina Department of Education, of Columbia, for Respondent.

This case involves whether Act 195 of 2004, 2004 S.C. Act 1898, violates Art. III, § 17 of the South Carolina Constitution.

Disciplinary Counsel Lesley M. Coggiola, Senior Counsel Henry B. Richardson, Jr., and Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Barbara M. Seymour, all of Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. C. Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Respondent.

This is an attorney disciplinary matter.

James Fletcher Thompson, of Spartanburg, for Appellants. Kenneth L. Tootle, and Scott M. Merrifield, of Quindle & Merrifield, of Beaufort, for Respondent. Diane Piazza DeWitt, of Beaufort, Guardian Ad Litem.

In this adoption case, the adoptive parents appeal from the family court’s orders revoking the birth mother’s consent to adoption and finding placement of the child with the birth mother would be in the best interest of the child.

William E. Booth, III, of Booth Law Firm, of West Columbia, for Petitioner. Ralph Shealy Kennedy, Jr., of Batesburg-Leesville, and Blaney A. Coskrey, III, of Columbia, for Respondent.

This case involves whether the court of appeals erred in granting the respondent’s motion for summary judgment in a conversion action.

Appellate Defender M. Celia Robinson, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney General S. Creighton Waters, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Kevin Scott Brackett, of York, for Respondent.

This criminal appeal asks whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the State’s motion to re-sentence appellant following appellant’s failure to comply with his plea agreement.